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ABSTRACT
In big-time college football, successful recruiting is the foundation on which
winning programs stand. Power-5 football and men’s basketball operate under a
dominant institutional logic that values generating revenue above all else. Winning
generates revenue and, accordingly, Power-5 stakeholders are often engulfed in their
unique athletic roles. The system propagates adherence to a singular focus that
emphasizes winning and revenue generation. This dominant institutional logic governing
big-time college football has been dubbed jock capitalism (Southall & Nagel, 2009).
While prominent theorists have analyzed college sports through an institutional logic
perspective, a systematic examination of the Power-5 football recruiting process has not
been conducted to this point. The three parts of this dissertation aimed to examine
components of the college football recruiting process through the primary framework of
Power-5 football’s dominant institutional logic. Findings reveal that athletic role
engulfment and racially tasked disparate roles have been institutionalized within
Southeastern Conference (SEC) football; proliferated by institutional actors (e.g.
recruiters and coaches) and adhered to by recruits and players. In the SEC, the emphasis
placed on winning football games directly reflects an institutional jock capitalism logic.
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PREFACE
From 2012 to 2018, I worked in various roles in the Southeastern Conference
(SEC). I was exposed to the business of college sports and inundated with National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) language and ideology. While working in
football recruiting I propagated this ideology, indoctrinating countless recruits and
employees into the NCAA college-sport hegemony. Just as I did, college athletes,
employees, fans and other stakeholders grow up cheering on the NCAA’s collegiate
model, accepting societal norms that perpetuate the current system. Having indoctrinated
countless recruits and employees, I experienced firsthand an environment replete with
academic dysfunction, role engulfment, and enabling behaviors. Within the institutional
field of Power-5 athletics, I was expected to accept morally and ethically questionable
practices as part of the business. Subsequently, the following studies that comprise this
dissertation were developed sequentially, with the first study informing the second, while
the third study was informed by both previous studies. In addition to all the studies being
interconnected, they also all had their genesis in the question whose answer led me to
leave the college football recruiting profession; Does college football recruiting really
benefit the recruits?
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2018, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) made
significant changes to the manner which college athletes can transfer institutions (G.
Johnson, 2019). “The transfer portal” has altered the landscape of college athletics by
removing transfer and eligibility barriers (Dodd, 2019). Nowhere has the effect of the
transfer portal been greater than in Division I football. During the 2018-2019 academic
year, nearly 10,000 college athletes from Division I institutions entered their names in the
transfer portal. Football players accounted for 25% of these transfers (G. Johnson, 2019).
This 25% represents an increase of about 1,000 Division I football players’ intention to
transfer from the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 academic years; the two academic years
prior to the implementation of the transfer portal (NCAA, 2019a). In addition to the
implementation of the transfer portal, the NCAA adopted a one-time transfer exemption
rule in April 2021. Previously, college athletes were prohibited from participating in
athletic competition for one academic year upon transferring (Dellenger, 2021). The onetime exemption allows college athletes to transfer institutions once without having to sit
out from competition for any amount of time (Auerbach, 2021). Some college football
coaches have likened the transfer portal and transfer exemptions to National Football
League (NFL) free agency where a market is created by multiple teams bidding for the
services of players (Caron, 2019; Costello, 2021; Vrentas, 2021). Whereas in the NFL the
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market created by free agency can lead to lucrative contracts, in college football the
transfer market bears no financial ramifications on the athlete.
The easing of restrictions on college athlete transfers and recent litigation on
college athlete compensation heard by the United States Supreme Court (Alston v. NCAA,
2020) illustrate the manner in which college sports are changing. While the merits of
simplifying the transfer process and allowing college athletes the freedom to transfer in a
manner consistent with traditional students has been a byproduct of the implementation
of the transfer portal (and remains an important dialogue that requires continued
examination and revision [Dodd, 2018; 2019; Higgins, 2019]), the reasoning behind
football players’ decisions to transfer has received insufficient examination. Traditional
students tend to transfer due to academic reasons (Li, 2010), college athletes tend to
transfer for athletics reasons; primarily, when the expectation before attending an
institution doesn’t meet the experience once enrolled (NCAA, 2016). Given the
disconnect between the experience as a recruit and as a college athlete, an examination of
the elements that comprise the recruiting process is merited.
College athletics recruiting is described by the NCAA as the lifeblood of college
sports (NCAA, n.d., para. 1). Recruiting in college football is a major industry that can
carry multi-million-dollar ramifications for athletic departments and coaches. During the
2017-2018 academic year, 62 college football programs spent over a million dollars on
recruiting alone (Ching, 2018). College football coaches are compelled to make large
financial investments in recruiting due to the effect that successful recruiting can have on
job retention (Maxcy, 2013). Successful recruiting can help save a coach’s job in a
volatile field where 11% of NCAA Division I head football coaches are fired each year
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(Daughters, 2013). Additionally, college athletic departments make the investment in
football recruiting due to the relationship between recruiting success and team success
(e.g. winning championships) (Caro, 2012; Caro & Benton, 2012). The monetary benefits
that accrue to athletic departments with successful (i.e. winning) football programs make
the investment in football recruiting a worthwhile risk. The University of Alabama for
instance, has seen expenses for the football program rise by over 75% since head coach
Nick Saban’s hiring in 2007 (Casagrande, 2016). In 2019, Alabama football spent $2.6
million on recruiting; up 30% from 2015 (Casagrande, 2020). The investment, however,
has paid off with 9 top-ranked recruiting class and 6 national championships in Saban’s
14-years as head coach. Alabama’s athletic department has seen revenue increase from
$64 million in 2008 to $164 million in 2019 (Casagrande, 2016; 2020).
Alabama’s football team accounted for $106.3 million of the revenue generated
by the athletic department in 2019. Of Alabama’s 18 other athletic teams, men’s
basketball was the only team to make money in that year; generating $66,921
(Casagrande, 2020). Such figures illustrate the dominant institutional logic that major
college athletics operate within. Southall & Nagel (2009) coined the term jock capitalism
to describe the financial enterprise that dictates college athletics under the guise of
amateurism. Profit-athletes are “NCAA college athletes whose estimated market value
exceeds the value of NCAA-approved compensation (i.e. grant-in-aid),” and typically
consist of athletes in the sports of football and men’s basketball (Kidd et al., 2018, p.
116). Profit-athletes are responsible for generating money that in large part funds the
entire athletic department, sustaining the operation of all the other athletic teams
sponsored by the University (Southall & Weiler, 2014). An unconscious adherence to the
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dominant institutional logic of jock capitalism ensures that those within major college
athletics maintain an unspoken code of silence (Adams et al., 2014; Gutierrez &
McLaren, 2012; LoMonte, 2020) while maintaining that “amateur defines the
participants, not the enterprise” (Brand, 2006, p. 8).
While studies on college athletics recruiting can be found in the literature, other
studies cater towards practice in the areas of recruiting and coach retention (Maxcy,
2013), the relationship between recruiting success and team success (Bergman & Logan,
2016; Caro, 2012; Caro & Benton, 2012; Dronyk-Trosper & Stitzel, 2017; Langelett,
2003; Pitts & Evans, 2016), NCAA regulations and parity between teams (Eckard, 1998;
Fizel & Bennett, 1996), geographic recruiting areas (May, 2012; Reimann, 2004), media
coverage (Yanity & Edmondson, 2011), and the qualities that comprise a successful
recruiter (Magnusen et al., 2011; Magnusen et al., 2014; Treadway et al., 2014). While
not attempting to underscore the importance of conducting research with practical
ramifications, a theoretical examination of the recruiting process from an institutional
standpoint is missing in college athletics recruiting literature.
In college athletics, recruiting informs the decision-making process for which an
athlete will sign a National Letter of Intent (NLI) (Bigsby et al., 2017; Corr, Southall, &
Nagel, 2020; Czekanski & Barnhill, 2015; Dumond et al., 2008). The football recruiting
process creates an expectation as to what life as an athlete will entail and, as evident by
the number of college football players entering the transfer portal, that expectation is not
always indicative of the lived college experience (Corr, Southall, & Nagel, 2020; NCAA,
2016). Utilizing institutional logic as a theoretical starting point, this dissertation aims to
examine the Power-5 college football recruiting process; with specific regards to
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institutional practices (that create expectations [Corr, Southall, & Nagel, 2020]) and the
role of recruiters performing institutional work. The line of research was, by design,
systematic in that (1) institutional recruiting practices were examined, (2) the recruiters
performing institutional work were examined, and (3) the institutional practices and
recruiters performing institutional work were examined utilizing a critical race
perspective. While the gap in the literature made the research area appealing, the
examination of the recruiting process from an institutional standpoint has potential
significance both theoretically and practically. Currently, such an examination may not
exist due to the difficulty of penetrating the insider-only collective that is college athletics
(Adler & Adler, 1991; Hatteberg, 2018; Southall & Weiler, 2014).

5

CHAPTER 2
SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE RECRUITING OFFICIAL VISITS
AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE INSTITUTION OF POWER-5 COLLEGE
SPORT
While all college athletes, their families, and fans of every college sport are
emotionally invested in “their” sport, the level of scrutiny and financial investment in
recruiting is most pronounced at the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) level,
among what have become known as the “Power-5” and “Group of 5” conferences. The
Power-5 conferences include the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big Ten Conference
(Big-10), Big XII Conference (Big XII), Pacific-12 Conference (PAC-12), and
Southeastern Conference (SEC). The Group of 5 conferences include the American
Athletic Conference (AAC), Conference USA (C-USA), Mid-American Conference
(MAC), Mountain West Conference (MWC), and Sun Belt Conference (Sun Belt).
The apex of college-sport recruiting takes place within Power-5 athletic
departments that have budgets that routinely exceed $100 million. Table 2.1 highlights
the ten Power-5 athletic departments with the highest revenues and expenses. Within the
Power-5 institutional field, football and men’s basketball are the sports that provide
almost all athletic department revenues. Much of the revenues are dispersed to athletic
departments from Power-5 conference media rights (See Table 2.2).
There are numerous recruiting websites that produce recruiting news 24-hours a
day, 7-days a week. Sports and entertainment networks (e.g., ESPN, NBCSN, and Fox
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Sports) devote hours of programming prior to the various “National Signing Days.” Two
prominent recruiting websites include the “official” National Letter of Intent
(nationalletter.org), jointly administered by the Collegiate Commissioners Association
(CCA) and the NCAA and Next College Student Athlete (NCSA)
(https://www.ncsasports.org), formerly known as the National Collegiate Scouting
Association.
Recruiting and signing college athletes is so important that within hours of
winning the 2015-16 College Football Playoff (CFP) national championship, Smith
(2016) noted University of Alabama head football coach Nick Saban was busy contacting
recruits hoping to secure commitments. Coaches, players and fans recognize the
importance of recruiting, particularly among the Power-5 sports of football, and men’s
and women’s basketball. Future players, as young as 14-years of age, are already on fans’
proverbial radar screens. Head and assistant coaches know full well their livelihood
depends on successful recruiting (Wood, 2010). In some cases, college coaches are
scorned for recruiting failures as much as on-the-field-or-court subpar performances.
Athletic directors and college presidents often field questions from fans and members of
the media concerning their coaches’ recruiting efforts. In today’s social media
environment, fans react to recruits’ posts as real-time indicators of coaches’ recruiting
proficiency or deficiency. Increased year-round attention has resulted in a limited amount
of “down time” for everyone involved.
In response, in 2004 the NCAA instituted restrictions on campus visits to, “…end
the celebrity atmosphere that [had] developed around the recruiting visit” (Hutton, 2004,
para. 5). Despite the heightened focus on college sport recruiting and its importance in a
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program’s success, little is known about the recruiting process beyond anecdotal accounts
and portrayals in movies and television shows (Bennett, 2008). Guided by organizational
and institutional theories, this study examines the content of Power-5 conference official
visit itineraries and compares findings by gender and sport.
Theoretical Frameworks
Organizational Culture
NCAA teams, athletic departments, and Power-5 conferences all have an internal
set of agreed upon values, which at an individual organizational level Schein (1984)
identified as an organization’s culture: basic assumptions that have been invented,
discussed or developed to address problems or challenges. After these assumptions have
worked well enough to be considered valid, they are taught to new members as “…the
correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, 1984, p. 3).
These symbolic organizational assumptions and structures rationalize an organization’s
stated values and guide organizational members’ practical day-to-day actions. Since
values are aspirational, organizations must also develop and pass on to new members
cultural templates as guardrails that have worked in the past, and can be relied upon by
members as they face present-day challenges.
At Power-5 team, athletic department, and conference levels, there is an interface
in which dominant individual organizational cultures coalesce into an overarching
dominant institutional logic, which – in the case of NCAA Power-5 college sport –
Southall and Nagel (2009) referred to as “jock capitalism.” This institutional structure,
which provides stability and meaning (See Figure 2.1), did not develop organically but
was created – and has been subsequently maintained and supported – through the shared
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efforts and choices of Power-5 team, athletic department and Power-5 conference
members. This organizational/institutional structure is not monolithic and homogenous
but rather an arrangement in which constant tension exists and negotiation occurs among
and between organizational and institutional members.
Institutional Theory
In addition to research utilizing an organizational culture framework, various
elements of institutional theory, including: institutionalization, institutional logics,
institutional change, and institutional propaganda have been used to examine the macrodynamics through which large-scale social and economic changes have occurred within
the Power-5 college-sport institutional field (Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). Fundamental
to any of these processes is a system of institutional values and practices that are
“…taken for granted presumably because people are either not consciously aware of,
perceive, or question these phenomena” (Woolf et al., 2016, p. 439). As Jepperson (1991)
and Woolf et al. (2016) noted, these represented institutional practices are similar to
performance scripts that institutional members perform almost without thinking. These
scripts not only determine acceptable or unacceptable operational means, they also guide
the implementation of institutional strategies, routines, and precedents (Southall et al.,
2008).
As Meyer and Rowan (1977) discussed, in order to maintain the ceremonial
conformity of policies and practices that function as powerful myths and are
institutionalized as rationalized concepts of organizational work, organizations adopt
formal structures that reflect “…the myths of their institutional environments instead of
the demands of their work activities” (p. 341). These mythological institutional rules tend
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to buffer formal structures from the uncertainties that arise between formal structures and
actual work activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
During official visits, which can last no longer than 48-hours, institutions can pay
for a prospect’s (and up to four family members) transportation to and from campus,
lodging, meals, and entertainment (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.4). Throughout the
recruiting process, recruiters perform institutional work, through which they articulate to
recruits purported institutional structures within which the recruits will live, work and
play once they have been accepted as members of the athletic team. Official visits are
presented to recruits as an indication of the lived experiences of current team members.
Throughout scripted official visits, recruiters communicate mythological ceremonial
facades to recruits.
As Scott (2005) noted, the myriad facets of institutional theory provide a context
within which to investigate an institutional field. Institutional actors operate within these
“rationalized” systems in pursuit of specified goals. In addition, these models of
rationality are cultural systems “…constructed to represent appropriate methods for
pursuing [institutional goals] or purposes” (Scott, 2005, p. 5). Consistently, institutional
theorists (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Nite et al., 2019; Nite & Washington, 2017; Scott,
2005, Southall et al., 2008) have posited that an institution’s norms of rationality play a
causal role in the creation and maintenance of formal organizational structures and
accepted, taken-for-granted facts, which Friedland and Alford (1991) identified as a
central or dominant institutional logic. On a macro level, this logic not only guides the
development, evaluation and implementation of strategies, but also informs operational
procedures and future innovation (Duncan & Brummett, 1991; Friedland & Alford, 1991;
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Nelson & Winter, 1982; Washington & Ventresca, 2004). An institution’s dominant logic
shapes how institutional actors engage in coherent, well-understood, and acceptable
activities. In this sense, then, institutions become “encoded in actors’ stocks of practical
knowledge [that] influence[s] how people communicate, enact power, and determine
what behaviors to sanction and reward” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 98). However, these
unquestioned facts (e.g., an institution’s logic) may be subject to ongoing dissonance, or
– over time – the institutional field may be disrupted.
Dominant Power-5 Institutional Logic
The dissonance between higher education’s espoused educational values and
those of
Division I (e.g., Power-5) college athletic departments has been well documented. As far
back as 1929 the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching contended
college sport was being ruined by commercialism and detailed abuses that threatened to
corrupt college sport`s presumed purpose (Hersch, 1990). For almost as long as college
sport has existed, a common criticism has been college and universities have sacrificed
their academic credibility in the name of athletic success (Hersch, 1990). This value
incongruence, as Schroeder (2010) noted, is the result of an institutional field in which
athletic departments are – in many ways – independent institutional entities that often
develop independent values that are in conflict with those of the universities in which
they are housed.
However, college athletic departments are not monolithic organizations with only
one set of departmental values or practices. In addition, the institution of NCAA Power-5
college sport is not homogeneous. Numerous investigations (Padilla & Baumer, 1994;
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Putler & Wolfe, 1999; Santomier et al., 1980; Schroeder, 2010; Southall et al., 2005)
have found competing athletic department priorities, with Southall et al. (2005) and
Schroeder (2010) uncovering significant differences between the most crystalized values
of Division I and Power-5 revenue and non-revenue, and male and female sport
programs, with the most pronounced differences being between football and men’s
basketball and all other sports. Within FBS Power-5 Conference athletic departments,
male revenue-sports constitute a subculture that values winning above almost anything
else and feels constrained by many NCAA bylaws (Santomier et al., 1980; Southall et al.,
2005). Tellingly, Martin (1992) noted members who feel disconnected from espoused
core organizational values either develop a counterculture and engage in organizational
deviance or adopt a competing institutional logic that replaces the previously dominant
one.
In 1987, Sack developed a college-sport matrix that delineated the various levels
of professionalism and commercialism that exist in the institutional field of NCAA
college sport. He contended that college sport was to varying degrees both professional
and amateur, as well as commercialized and non-commercialized. The various NCAA
divisions and conferences epitomized these differentiations (See Figure 2.2). Within this
identified institutional field, there is strong evidence that over the past 50 years a
commercialized, revenue-seeking institutional logic has become dominant within Power5 college sport (Southall & Nagel, 2008; Southall et al., 2008; Southall, Southall, &
Dwyer, 2009; Southall et al., 2014).
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Institutional Work
The creation, maintenance and disruption of an institution’s dominant logic does
not occur in isolation but is the result of – and reflects – the lived experiences of
organizational and institutional actors. Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2011) describe this
process as institutional work, which occurs within existing institutional structures, while
simultaneously producing, reproducing, and transforming the institution. Institutional
work offers a framework within which institutional actors live, work, and play, and which
delineates their roles, relationships, resources, and routines (Lawrence et al., 2011).
The concept of institutional work moves beyond the static view that embedded
institutional norms, structures and logics reproduce regardless of praxis (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and recognizes that influential institutional leaders
often actively create, maintain, disrupt and recreate institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby,
2006; Nite & Washington, 2017).
An example of a leader’s institutional disruption and recreation of an institution’s
logic through the introduction, dissemination, and insertion of a performance script into
an institution’s consciousness was Myles Brand’s (former NCAA President) institutional
work redefining amateurism as The Collegiate Model of Athletics, which isolated the
concept of amateurism to college athletes while allowing rampant commercialism and
maximization of revenue-producing opportunities (NCAA, 2010). As Southall &
Staurowsky (2013) noted, Brand wanted to maintain the collegiate model by engaging in
institutional work that legitimized college athletes’ exclusion from college sport’s jock
capitalism.

13

Almost 10-years later, this institutional script (i.e., the collegiate model) has
gained so much traction within the institutional field of NCAA Power-5 college sport that
on October 29, 2019, when the NCAA national office disseminated a press release
outlining a “ground-breaking” shift in policy toward players’ use of their own name,
image and likeness, the collegiate-model institutional script was utilized as a delimiting
maintenance tool. The press release positioned the NCAA as supporting college athletes’
rights and embracing “…change to provide the best possible experience for college
athletes” (NCAA, 2019c, para. 1). However, the release’s lede still articulated a
commercial institutional logic that restricted college athletes’ right to benefit from the use
of their name, image and likeness, since any monetization had to occur within the
NCAA’s collegiate model (NCAA, 2019c, para. 1). What is left unsaid is that the
collegiate model (as embodied in NCAA bylaws) precludes college athletes from
receiving: “Any direct or indirect salary, gratuity or comparable compensation” (NCAA,
2019d, Bylaw 12.1.2.1.1.). The use of this script is consistent with the theory of
institutional work, since institutional actors who benefit from an institutional script tend
to work to maintain their favorable positions (Nite & Washington, 2017).
Within NCAA Power-5 college sport (football and men's basketball in particular)
recruiting is impacted by technical forces that shape the “core” functions (e.g., work
units, coordinated arrangements and duties of recruiters), as well as institutional forces
that reflect more peripheral structures (e.g., managerial and governance systems imposed
by the NCAA governance structure) (Scott, 2005). Within Power-5 college sport
recruiting, some institutional requirements (e.g., NCAA recruiting-related bylaws) are
strongly backed by authoritative agents or effective surveillance systems and sanctions
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(e.g., NCAA, conference, and/or athletic department compliance offices). Recruiters’
responses to such forces will vary, depending on which elements are predominant:
external controls (e.g., surveillance and sanctions) or internalized processes that rely on
organizational actors holding deeply set beliefs and assumptions (Scott, 2005). External
controls – in the absence of deeply set beliefs – often result in strategic deviant responses
(e.g., bending, breaking or ignoring imposed rules) (Santomier et al., 1980; Southall et
al., 2005).
This exploratory study drew upon institutional theory and, specifically,
institutional work to examine official recruiting visits as examples of institutional
maintenance work, since although institutions are considered to be enduring entities,
organizational actors must still “work” to maintain and communicate institutional
practices to internal and external constituencies. Specifically, if one of a college-sport
recruiter’s tasks is communicating a team’s values to recruits, an official visit
communicates to prospective members how institutional members communicate, enact
power, and determine what behaviors will be sanctioned or rewarded (Barley & Tolbert,
1997). An official visit’s unquestioned, taken-for-granted “facts” reflect particular
courses of action developed into performance scripts (i.e., official visit itineraries), which
introduce recruits to a team’s institutional practices (Jepperson, 1991; Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006; Woolf, et al., 2016).
An important element of an official recruiting visit is determining whether recruits
“fit in.” Consistent with Woolf et al. (2016), one of a recruiter’s major functions is
developing a structure within which recruits are socialized into existing institutional
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practices. The maintenance of existent institutional norms depends on recruits being
exposed to and coming to embrace and internalize a team’s espoused values .
Research Context
In official NCAA parlance, recruiting is “…any solicitation of a prospective
student-athlete1 (PSA) or a PSA’s relatives…by an institutional staff member or by a
representative of the institution’s athletics interests for the purpose of securing the PSA’s
enrollment and ultimate participation in the institution’s intercollegiate athletics
program” (NCAA, 2019b Bylaw 13.02.14). While a football or men’s basketball
program’s success (e.g., wins, players “turning pro”) is a key factor in many player
decisions, visiting campus is an important opportunity for a program to sell itself, and
players to find out if they are comfortable with the coaches and other players (Anderson,
2012; Lawrence & Kaburakis, 2008; Letawsky et al., 2003). Power-5 prospects may take
five official visits during their senior year but can take no more than one to any individual
institution (NCAA, 2019b Bylaw 13.6.2.1; Bylaw 13.6.2.2.1.3).2
Broadly, Bylaw 13 of the NCAA D-I Manual outlines recruiting guidelines. There
are specific policies related to transportation (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.5), lodging
(NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.6), entertainment (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.7),
complimentary admissions to athletic events (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.7.2), meals
(NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.7.7), and cash disbursement to student host(s) to cover costs

Consistent with Staurowsky and Sack (2005), in this manuscript the term “studentathlete” refers to a specific use in an NCAA bylaw (e.g., “prospective student-athlete”).
In all other circumstances, the term “college-athlete” is used.
2
Football recruits may begin taking official visits April 1st of their junior year. Men’s
basketball recruits may take five official visits during their junior year and an additional
five during their senior year.
1
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for entertainment (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.7.5) while PSA’s and their family are on
an official visit. Other than the NCAA Eligibility Center clearing a PSA to take an
official visit, there are no bylaws specifically mandating academic-related discussions
during an official visit.
Given an official visit’s importance and relatively short (48-hour) duration,
planning is extremely detailed, with time often allocated down to the minute (Sallee,
2014). In most instances, programs prepare a written itinerary and provide it to a recruit’s
travel party and current athlete host(s). According to the NCAA’s regulatory framework,
official-visit activities must be comparable to what a “regular student” might experience
on a campus visit, or at least commensurate with what is regularly provided to athletes at
that institution (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaws 13.6.6; 13.6.7.7). In addition, the NCAA wants
official visits to mimic what a college athlete should expect upon enrollment at an
institution. Extant research has found campus visits aid in prospective students’
understanding of “the nature of college…[which] may be important to his or her future
success…[and being] academically [prepared] for college admission” (Radcliffe & Bos,
2013, p. 137). Lytle (2012) notes college campus visits are intended to provide
prospective college students with brief – but realistic – introductions to campus life,
which will assist in students’ college-selection process.
Another purpose of any college visit is to introduce prospective students to the
concept of time management. It is customary for a full-time college student to be enrolled
in four-to-five courses, which meet for 12-15 hours per week (Pelletier & Laska, 2012).
In addition, it is recommended college students devote two-three hours per week to
outside study time for each hour of class time (Nelson, 2010). This equates to 30-45
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hours per week for a full-time student enrolled in four-to-five classes. The NCAA (2016)
contends college athletes spend 38.5 hours (23% of their week) on academics. According
to the same NCAA report, college athletes spend an average of 34 hours (20%) on
athletics (NCAA, 2016).
For traditional prospective SEC students (i.e., students not participating in
collegiate athletics), campus tours are standardized across the 14-member conference.
Each SEC university has an admissions page where students can register for a campus
tour. While the campus tour is complementary, expenses related to travel, lodging,
dining, and even parking are the responsibility of individual potential students and their
family. According to admissions office websites, these campus tours usually last 2-4
hours and consist of an academic information session, and tours of the central part of
campus, libraries, dorm rooms/student housing, dining halls/food courts, and recreation
facilities. In addition, many individual colleges and departments within SEC universities
also offer orientations for admitted students that function as an extension of the university
campus visit. These orientations, while specialized to a specific academic discipline, do
not include reimbursement for travel, lodging, dining, or parking.
Within this context, this study documented and categorized official-visit
itineraries as examples of institutional work performed by members of SEC teams and
athletic departments. The following section details the sampling frame, as well as the
data-collection and coding procedures.
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Methodology
Sampling Frame
The Southeastern Conference (SEC) was chosen as this study’s sampling frame
due to the conference’s position as the premier conference in collegiate athletics (Renkel,
2017). The SEC consists of 14 member institutions and offers a total of 21 sports: 9
men’s and 12 women’s. While offering the least number of sports among Power-5
conferences, the SEC spends more money on recruiting than any other conference
(Ching, 2018). In terms of a financial commitment, the SEC places more of an emphasis
on recruiting than any other Power-5 conference. Notably, in 2017-2018, SEC athletic
departments had four of the top-five and eight of the top-20 Power-5 recruiting budgets
(Ching, 2018).
Procedure
Emails were sent to a designated member of each varsity sport
coaching/recruiting staff within each SEC athletic department, requesting official visit
itineraries from the year 2018 or 2019. For each institution and team, at least three
attempts were made. No responses or acknowledgments of these initial communication
attempts (across any sport or program) occurred. After achieving no success in obtaining
information via email solicitations, acquiring data through Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests was deemed the most efficient strategy, since 13 out of the 14 SEC
member universities are public universities (Vanderbilt University is the only private
university). Eight athletic departments responded to the FOIA request by providing
standard official visit itineraries across multiple sports from 2018 or 2019. Two athletic
departments requested payment to complete the FOIA request and three athletic
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departments provided no response. It should be noted that the three athletic departments
that did not respond operate in states that require residency requirements to fulfill FOIA
requests.
Data
A “typical” itinerary consisted of one-to-two pages of chronologically-organized
activities with parenthetical location and transportation information. All itineraries
presented a detailed schedule outlining official-visit activities. Contact information for
coaches, support staff, and athlete hosts was also noted on itineraries.
Within a thematic framework containing three college-athlete roles: 1) athletic, 2)
academic, and 3) social (Adler & Adler, 1987; 1991), official-visit itinerary elements
were coded and duration of activities (in minutes) calculated. The NCAA classification of
recruits as “prospective student-athletes,” purportedly acknowledges the primacy of
recruits’ academic role. In addition, acknowledging the importance of allowing recruits to
socialize and be entertained NCAA regulations: a) permit travel of up to 30 miles from an
institution’s primary campus for the purpose of entertainment while a PSA is on an
official visit (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.7.1); b) allow institutions to spend up to $40
per day, per PSA on activities specifically related to entertainment (NCAA, 2019b,
Bylaw 13.6.7.8); and c) permit a student host, or a member of an athletic team at the
institution, to be provided with $40 per day for the purpose of entertaining a PSA during
an official visit (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.7.5).
Individual activities were coded by a team of researchers trained in thematic and
discourse analysis. An athletic activity was any activity specifically related to potential
sport participation (i.e., meeting with an athletic coach, observing practice or an athletic
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contest, trying on athletic equipment, and/or taking a tour of a strength and conditioning
facility). An academic activity was specifically related to academics (i.e., meeting with a
faculty member, observing a college class, and/or taking a tour of an academic facility).
Examples of social activities were going to the movies with a host(s), attending a football
game3, and/or sharing a meal with current team members. It should be noted that across
all sports, social activities almost exclusively took place in the evening or at night. Table
2.3 provides representative coding examples.
The number of times a themed-activity was listed, as well as the amount of time
dedicated to that activity during a 48-hour official visit was calculated. By summarizing
listed instances and minutes dedicated , the amount of institutional work devoted to each
theme/role could be determined. The twenty-one individual sports were initially
categorized by gender. In addition, based on Sack’s (1987) and Southall and
Staurowsky’s (2013) typologies, sports were separated into three categories related to
revenue generation: a) non-revenue sports, b) revenue sports, and c) profit sports. The
non-revenue sports in this study typically generate less than $100,000 of revenue and
included: beach volleyball, equestrian, men’s and women’s golf, gymnastics, lacrosse,
rifle, soccer, softball, men’s and women’s swimming & diving, men’s and women’s
tennis, men’s and women’s track & field, volleyball, and wrestling. Revenue sports were
baseball and women’s basketball, teams that may generate substantial revenue but still
have expenses that exceed revenues. Power-5 profit sports are football and men’s

For non-football PSA’s, attending a football game was coded as a “social” activity.
However, a football PSA attending a football game was coded as an “athletic” activity,
since a football player would not view the game as a social event but as an athletic event.
Therefore, when PSAs attended a sporting event in which they would participate as a
college athlete, attending that game was coded as an athletic activity.
3
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basketball, teams that generate more revenue than expenses and fund revenue and nonrevenue sports’ operations. For some analyses, MANOVA tests compared variables
across a sample of eight institutions, allowed inferences across the 14 SEC members.
Findings
In total, 76 official visit itineraries from 21 sports from 2018 or 2019 were
collected. Thirty-three itineraries (43%) were from men’s sports and 43 (57%) were from
women’s sports. All itineraries allotted eight-hours each night for sleeping. Sixty-seven
of 76 (88%) itineraries listed the official visit’s date/day. Fifty-two (78%) official visits
took place over the course of a weekend (Friday through Sunday). Baseball (n = 4),
football (n = 7), and gymnastics (n = 4) were the only sports to have, exclusively,
weekend official visits.
Only 17 of 754 (23%) recruits stayed in dormitories with current college athletes
during their official visit. Of the 17 who stayed in dormitories, all were from non-revenue
sports: (i.e., equestrian, women's golf, gymnastics, rifle, softball, men's swimming &
diving, women's swimming & diving, women's tennis, women’s volleyball, and
wrestling), and only three were male athletes (2 swimming & diving, 1 wrestling). Fiftyseven of 75 recruits (76%) stayed in a hotel during their official visit. While 12 itineraries
did not specifically name the hotel, 45 recruits stayed at an identified hotel. According to
Google’s hotel “class-rating” measure (recognized by Forbes as a leading hotel review
site [Elliott, 2018]), 14 recruits (31%) stayed at a 4-star hotel5, 25 recruits (56%) stayed

One women’s volleyball itinerary did not report where PSA stayed during the official
visit.
5 Baseball, men’s basketball (2), women’s basketball, football (3), gymnastics, soccer,
men’s tennis, men’s track & field, women’s track & field (3).
4
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in a 3-star hotel6, and six recruits (13%) stayed in a 2-star hotel7. It should be noted that
within individual athletic departments, many teams utilized the same hotel for official
visits. Of the 14 recruits who stayed at a 4-star hotel, eight were recruits of the same
school and represented six different sports. 8 Overall, recruits tended to stay at the highest
rated hotel in closest proximity to campus.
Overall, social activities were the most prevalent (MSocial = 8.2) and had the most
time allocated (MSocial = 10 hours and 35 minutes [10:35]). Athletic activities (MAthletics =
4.1) were less prevalent and had less time allotted (MAthletics = 4:58). Academic activities
were the least prevalent (MAcademics =1.2) (MAcademics = 1:06).
Individual Sports
Table 2.4 summarizes itinerary content by sport. When individual sports were
examined, several noteworthy findings emerge.
Gymnastics (MSocial = 14:35), football (MSocial = 14:23), and men’s swimming &
diving (MSocial = 13:20) dedicated the most time to social activities, while rifle (MSocial =
5:30), women’s volleyball (MSocial = 5:00), and women’s lacrosse (MSocial = 4:25)
dedicated the least. Rifle (MAthletics = 11:00), women’s swimming & diving (MAthletics =
7:09), and men’s basketball (MAthletics = 7:06) dedicated the most time to athletics, while
softball (MAthletics = 3:08), women’s golf (MAthletics = 2:26), and women’s lacrosse (MAthletics
= 0:00) dedicated the least. Equestrian (MAcademics = 6:35), rifle (MAcademics = 6:30), and

Baseball, women’s basketball (2), football (2), men’s golf, women’s golf (2),
gymnastics, lacrosse, soccer (2), softball (3), men’s swimming & diving, women’s
swimming & diving (2), men’s tennis, women’s tennis (2), men’s track & field (3),
women’s track & field.
7 Baseball, men’s golf (2), soccer, men’s track & field, volleyball.
8 Baseball, football, soccer, men’s tennis, men’s and women’s track & field.
6

23

women’s lacrosse (MAcademics = 2:15) dedicated the most time to academics but each sport
had only a single itinerary. The gender-combined sports (i.e., women’s [MAcademics = 2:03]
and men’s track & field [MAcademics = 2:00]; women’s [MAcademics = 1:24] and men’s
swimming & diving [MAcademics = 1:26]) dedicated the most time to academics, while
women’s volleyball (MAcademics = :15), baseball (MAcademics = :15), and women’s soccer
(MAcademics = :24) dedicated the least.
Gender
Table 2.5 highlights the gathered data in the context of gender differentiations.
While men’s sports dedicated 1:42 more time to social activities, time dedicated to
athletics was roughly equivalent for men’s (MAthletics = 4:57) and women’s (MAthletics =
4:59) sports. However, the number of athletic activities was greater in men’s (MAthletics =
4.7) than women’s sports (MAthletics = 3.7). Men’s and women’s itineraries contained
roughly the same number of academic activities (MAcademics = 1.1 and 1.2) but women’s
sports dedicated 24 minutes more to academics. In addition, multivariate analyses for
gender indicated that official visits for male sports dedicated significantly less time to
academics than official visits for female sports (P<.01).
Non-Revenue Sports
The average amount of time devoted to social activities during non-revenue sport
visits was (MSocial = 10:23). The average number of athletic activities among non-revenue
sports was (MAthletics = 3.8), spanning (MAthletics = 5:02). The average number of athletic
and academic activities, as well as time allotted to athletic and academic activities, was
nearly identical for male and female non-revenue sports. However, on average, male nonrevenue sports dedicated more time (MSocial = 1:18) to social activities than female non-
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revenue sports. The average number of academic activities was (MAcademics = 1.2), with
only 1:16 during an official visit devoted to academics.
Revenue Sports
Revenue sport (baseball [n = 5] and women’s basketball [n = 3]) itineraries
contained an average of 8.3 social activities with (on average) 10:55 dedicated to social
activities. The average number (MAthletics) = 4.0) and time (MAthletics = 4:17) of revenuesport athletic activities was lower than both non-revenue and profit sports. Across all
groups, academic activities were the least emphasized among revenue sports in both
number of activities (MAcademics = 0.8) and time (MAcademics = 0:28). Multivariate analyses
for sport groupings indicated that revenue sports dedicated significantly less time to
academics than non-revenue sports (P<.05).
Profit Sports
Football (n = 7) and men’s basketball (n = 4) itineraries contained an average of
10.1 social activities that comprised 12:10 of a visit. Profit sports dedicated (MSocial =
1:49) more to social activities than revenue or non-revenue sports, and averaged 2.1 more
athletics activities and dedicated :10 more to athletics. While football and men’s
basketball averaged more academic activities (MAcademics = 1.4), they dedicated (MAcademics
= :29) less time to academics. Multivariate analyses for sport groupings indicated football
and men’s basketball (i.e., “profit” sports) itineraries involved significantly more social
(P<.075) and athletic (P<.01) activities than revenue sports and non-revenue sports.
Discussion
Within the Southeastern Conference, official visit itineraries function as
performance scripts, in which athletic departments’ institutional practices are performed

25

and conveyed to PSAs. In addition, for recruiters and relevant stakeholders, Power-5
institutional scripts establish routines, communicate acceptable or unacceptable levels of
operational resource allocation and create precedent for changes to strategic initiatives.
While there is evidence of a dominant institutional recruiting logic in the SEC, within
athletic departments profit-sport official visit itineraries are similar in both content and
emphasis, while also significantly different from revenue and non-revenue sport
itineraries. These findings are not surprising, given that the SEC has been described as a
“copy-cat” conference, in which each program (e.g., team and athletic department) is well
aware of what other programs are doing. Teams within each category (i.e., male/female,
non-revenue/revenue/profit) replicated official visit itineraries, which offers evidence of
shared institutional work within the Southeastern Conference.
Consistent with previous research (Southall et al., 2005; Schroeder, 2010), while
there were no significant differences between itineraries based upon athletic department,
this study did find significant differences between profit and non-revenue sport
itineraries. Clearly, this study’s findings offer evidence of subcultures within athletic
departments, as well as the existence of a dominant institutional logic that recognizes the
ascendancy of Power-5 football (and to a lesser extent men’s basketball) within the
institutional field of NCAA Power-5 college sport.
This conference-level dominant logic is not surprising, since less-successful
departments and teams likely model their strategies and performance scripts after those of
more successful (in terms of wins and losses) programs. Given that many SEC coaches
have coached at other SEC schools (Levine, 2015), such mimicry or groupthink is to be
expected. In 2015, following their third national championship in five seasons, University

26

of Alabama football staff complained other football programs were copying many of their
recruiting materials (Kingsbury, 2015). This study’s findings offer evidence recruiters
follow similar “game plans” and engage in similar institutional work (Johnson, 2018).
Within the SEC institutional field, official visits introduce recruits to athletic
departments’ organizational values and the overall institutional practices of SEC
members. Activities undertaken during official visits send subtle and not-so-subtle
messages about what is important to both recruiters and recruits. Tailoring official visits
to what recruits’ value sends distinct signals that may be counter to espoused university
narratives (e.g., The importance of educational opportunities.). According to the Director
of On-Campus Recruiting for a football program in the SEC, a majority of official visits
begin on Fridays, since college football games are, traditionally, held on Saturdays. One
of the most important activities for all recruits (but especially for football recruits) is an
SEC football game (SEC Source 1, personal communication, September 18, 2019).
In addition to SEC football games being almost exclusively Saturday events,
many SEC sports feature competitions that occur over the course of a weekend (e.g., SEC
baseball and softball series typically occur on Fridays, Saturdays, & Sundays and
gymnastics meets are often held on Friday nights). Given these parameters, it is
reasonable that non-revenue recruiting staffs would schedule official visits to coincide
with home football games. According to an SEC football director of player personnel,
while there is some flexibility (based off individual recruits’ requests), official visits tend
to follow a football-centric schedule (SEC Source 2, personal communication, September
19, 2019).
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Recruits tend to not determine on which specific days an official visit will take
place. In addition, official visits most often take place on weekends, so recruits miss as
little school as possible. However, departments also strategically schedule official visits
on weekends, so recruits can experience an SEC gameday environment. Saturday nights
are tailor-made opportunities for current athletes to socialize with recruits, creating an
expectation of a college athlete’s social life. If official visits began in the middle of the
week (e.g., Wednesday/Thursday), recruits would be exposed to a much different college
experience with a balance of academic/social/athletic activities. While athletic and social
official visit activities are important, weekend recruiting trips limit a recruit’s exposure to
academic activities (e.g., classes, labs, lectures, libraries) and the academic rigors of
college life.
Official visits are formal institutional structures that re-present, as Meyer and
Rowan (1977) stated, “...the myths of their institutional environments instead of the
demands of their work activities” (p. 341). Power-5 official visits present a mythological
portrait of big-time college sport, suppressing and minimizing the academic demands of
attending what is – many times – a rigorous academic institution.
During a weekend official visit, recruits experience a campus environment
markedly different from a mid-week one. In many ways, official visits are ceremonial
façades through which recruiters present a scripted mythological college experience
communicating to recruits the importance of social and athletic activities. However, this
scripted experience bears little resemblance to the reality of college. While “academics”
forms the foundation of the NCAA grant-in-aid system official visits minimize academics
while emphasizing social and athletics activities over academics.
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Consistent with previous research regarding identified subcultures within Power-5
athletic departments, this study identified competing athletic department priorities
(Padilla & Baumer, 1994; Putler & Wolfe, 1999; Santomier et al., 1980; Schroeder, 2010;
Southall et al., 2005). While – in order to satisfy NCAA recruiting mandates – all sports
adhere to a similar official visit script template, observable differences offer evidence of
subcultures within athletic departments. Specifically, revenue and profit sports dedicated
more activities to social activities than any other component. In addition, profit sports
clearly emphasized athletic and social components, while minimizing academics. While
existence is not causation, such minimization is problematic given that Power-5 football
and men’s basketball players graduate at significantly lower rates than full-time male
students (Southall et al., 2015), consume alcohol at higher rates than both the general
student body and female athletes (Leichliter et al., 1998; Olthuis et al., 2011), and
become engulfed in their glorified athlete role (Adler & Adler, 1987, 1989, 1991; Kidd et
al., 2018). Clearly, this study’s itineraries are not consistent with the totality of a college
athlete’s experience. Identifying this emphasis on athletic and social components during
official visits should inform future research into the relationship of institutional work
(i.e., recruiting) to athletic role engulfment of both Power-5 profit athletes and recruiters.
One of the purported tasks of a college recruiter is communicating institutional and
departmental values, and appropriate and/or acceptable actions and behaviors to recruits.
However, a recruiter’s ultimate goal is getting a recruit to sign a NLI and grant-in-aid
agreement. Therefore, the emphasis placed on specific components of an official visit
reflect the actions Power-5 recruiters deem appropriate to achieve these goals.
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A variety of future studies should be conducted in this area. Itineraries in other
Power-5 and Group of 5 conferences should be analyzed to determine the extent to which
there is an institutional recruiting logic that permeates Power-5 sports and Power-5 profit
sports in particular. In addition to content analyses, recruits across a variety of sports
should be interviewed to determine specific activities that occurred during their official
visits. To determine the degree to which Power-5 recruiters’ institutional work is
consciously designed to reinforce and support recruits’ athletic role engulfment, it is
suggested in-depth semi-structured interviews with Power-5 sport recruiters also be
undertaken. While such interviews will likely be difficult to arrange, such candid
discussions are a necessary adjunct to this study.
As Power-5 college athletes continue to be engulfed in their athletic roles (Kidd et
al., 2018), the institutional work of recruiting college athletes reflects the production,
reproduction and support for a dominant SEC institutional logic, in which SEC football is
the focal point. As Lawrence (2011) noted, institutional workers continually and actively
determine and transform the institutional structures within which they live, work, and
play. The focus of SEC recruiters on constructing and facilitating athletic and social
activities during official visits communicates to recruits the pre-eminent importance of
their athletic and social roles. If recruiters are – in fact – cognizant of recruits’ role
engulfed status, such construction helps meet the primary goal of securing a recruit’s
commitment. As any good salesperson does, recruiters read and play to recruits’ wants,
need and desires.
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Table 2.1: Top-Ten Power-5 Athletic Department Revenues-Expenses
Rank University

Conference Total Revenues Total Expenses

1

Texas

Big XII

2

$214,830,647

$207,022,323

Texas A&M SEC

$211,960,034

$146,546,229

3

Ohio State

Big Ten

$185,409,602

$173,507,435

4

Michigan

Big Ten

$185,173,187

$175,425,392

5

Alabama

SEC

$174,307,419

$158,646,962

6

Georgia

SEC

$157,852,479

$119,218,908

7

Oklahoma

Big XII

$155,238,481

$132,910,780

8

Florida

SEC

$149,165,475

$131,789,499

9

LSU

SEC

$147,744,233

$131,717,421

10

Auburn

SEC

$147,511,034

$132,885,979

Note. (Flaherty, 2018, 247sports.com).
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Table 2.2: 2019 Power Conference Revenue Distributions
Conference

2019 Distribution

Per-member

Big Ten

$760 million

$54.0 million

SEC

$660 million

$43.7 million

Big XII

$374 million

$34-37 million

Pac-12

$354 million

$29.5 million

ACC

$465 million

$29.5 million

Annual Revenues

$2.75 billion
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Table 2.3: Codes Examples & Themes
Code Example

Theme

Equipment Sizing with Head Equipment Manager [name omitted] &
Photo Shoot with Sports Information Director [name omitted]
Meet with Staff to review Strength and Conditioning plan

Athletic

Observe team shoot-around

Athletic

Athletic

College of Business. Meeting w/ Professor

Academic

Attend History Class with [name omitted]

Academic

Tour the Academic Center with Academic Advisor, Staff

Academic

Game night with the women's team!

Social

Breakfast at the Hotel with Girls and their families

Social

Walk to [football game]; Recruits on Field [for pregame]

Social

*Note. Codes represent examples taken verbatim from itineraries. Bracketed items
indicate names of individuals, universities, or facilities that have been removed to
maintain anonymity.
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Table 2.4: Sport Findings
Sport

n

Athletic
Items

Athletic
Time

Academic Academic Social
Items
Times
Items

Social
Time

Equestrian

1

5.0

6:05

4.0

6:35

8.0

12:55

Rifle

1

4.0

11:00

2.0

6:30

6.0

5:30

Lacrosse

1

1.0

0:00

1.0

2:15

9.0

4:25

Track & Field
(Women's)

5

4.0

6:50

1.8

2:03

9.8

10:32

Track & Field
(Men's)

5

4.4

5:57

1.8

2:00

8.6

12:28

Swimming &
Diving (Men's)

3

5.7

6:06

1.3

1:26

6.7

13:20

Diving
(Women's)

6

5.5

7:09

1.5

1:24

8.3

10:59

Golf
(Women's)

4

2.0

2:26

1.0

1:17

7.5

8:38

Gymnastics

3

3.7

5:50

1.0

1:05

8.3

14:35

Football

7

6.6

3:59

1.7

0:58

11.4

14:23

Basketball
(Women's)

3

4.3

4:10

1.3

0:51

11.7

10:48

Tennis
(Women's)

4

3.3

5:35

1.3

0:51

7.3

8:48

Softball

5

2.6

3:08

1.2

0:46

8.8

10:37

Tennis (Men's)

4

4.3

4:33

1.0

0:45

7.8

8:05

Wrestling

1

4.0

4:15

1.0

0:30

10.0

11:25

Basketball
(Men's)

4

4.8

7:06

0.8

0:26

7.8

8:18

Golf (Men's)

4

2.5

3:41

0.5

0:26

6.5

11:37

Soccer

5

4.8

4:41

0.6

0:24

8.6

10:55

Baseball

5

3.8

4:22

0.4

0:15

6.2

11:00

Volleyball

4

3.5

3:18

0.8

0:15

5.0

5:00

Swimming &

34

Beach
Volleyball

1

2.0

6:00

0.0

0:00

*Note. Figures represent calculated averages in cases where n>1.
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4.0

8:30

Table 2.5: Summary Statistics
Group

n

Athletic
Items

Athletic
Time

Academic Academic Social
Items
Times
Items

Social
Time

All Sports

76

4.1

4:58

1.2

1:06

8.2

10:35

Men’s Sports

33

4.7

4:57

1.1

0:53

8.2

11:33

Women’s
Sports

43

3.7

4:59

1.2

1:17

8.2

9:51

Profit Sports

11

5.9

5:07

1.4

0:46

10.1

12:10

8

4.0

4:17

0.8

0:28

8.3

10:55

Male NonRevenue
Sports

17

4.1

5:01

1.2

1:09

7.6

11:19

Female NonRevenue
Sports

40

3.7

5:03

1.2

1:19

7.9

10:01

Revenue
Sports

*Figures represent calculated averages
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Team/Program
(organizational)
Athletic Department
(intra-organizational)

Conference
(inter-organizational)
Power-5 College Sport
(institutional)
NCAA College Sport
(institutional)

Figure 2.1: College Sport’s Organizational and Institutional Layers
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Commercialized
Professional
Athletic Scholarships
Amateur
No Athletic Scholarships

Corporate Model
(Power-5, FBS)
Ivy Model
(Ivy League)

Less Commercialized
“Small Time”
Corporate Model
(FCS, D-II, D-III)
Amateur Model
(D-III)

Figure 2.2: Typology of College Athletic Conferences/Divisions (Sack, 1987)
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CHAPTER 3
SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE FOOTBALL RECRUITING:
INSTITUTIONALIZED ROLE ENGULFMENT AMONG RECRUITERS
For the past 30 years, the state of Florida has consistently had the greatest number
of high school football players recruited by NCAA Division I programs (NCAA, 2018).
A majority of these players have come from South Florida 9 (Underwood, 2019). In fact,
Miami-Dade and Broward 10 Counties are two of the most talent rich football counties in
the United States (Knox & Willis, n.d.). While these counties are football recruiting
hotbeds, they are also historically crime-ridden areas (Vassolo, 2018), with Opa-locka,
just north of Miami in Miami-Dade County, having “…the most violent crimes per capita
of any city in the [United States]” (Garcia-Roberts, 2009, para. 26).
In 2004, Willie Williams was a five-star linebacker from Opa-locka’s Miami
Carol City Senior High School and one of the nation’s top college football recruits.
Recruiting analysts frequently compared Williams to National Football League (NFL)
Hall-of-Famer Lawrence Taylor (Pearlman, 2014). At the request of the Miami Herald,
Williams agreed to chronicle his “official visits,” becoming one of the first football
recruits to give the “outside world” (e.g., college football fans, the media, and the general

9

South Florida encompasses a geographic region of Florida consisting of Broward,
Miami-Dade, and Monroe Counties (South Florida Regional Planning Council, n.d.).
10 Broward County is situated contiguously North of Miami-Dade County.
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public) an “inside look” at “big-time” football recruiting (Pearlman, 2014). Williams,
who lived in poverty in Opa-locka, detailed a recruiting environment markedly different
from the “normal” day-to-day reality of many residents of Miami-Dade and Broward
counties: “…private jets, police escorts, squads of cheering co-eds and a conveyer belt of
steak and lobster tails” (St. John, 2004, para. 4). Williams’ description of ice carvings,
expansive meals, and limo rides was dismissed by some as an aberration, or a young
man’s boastful exaggeration. However, other observers contended Williams’ experience
was – and is – the norm for five-star football recruits (DiMengo, 2014; Jude, 2020).
While the NCAA membership was forced to change several bylaws in an attempt to limit
the largesse heaped upon recruits such as Williams, official on-campus visits for
prospective Power-5 football recruits still include what most people would characterize
as lavish activities not typical of the recruitment or on-campus experiences of most
college students.
While college recruiting receives extensive media scrutiny, it has received little
systematic, critical examination. The NCAA contends on-campus recruiting visits are
designed to expose prospective college athletes to academic and social experiences
comparable to those of “regular students” (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaws 13.6.6; 13.6.7.7, p.
128). However, a recent analysis of SEC football official visit itineraries (Corr, Southall,
& Nagel, 2020) revealed a focus on social, entertainment, and athletic-related activities
during official recruiting visits. This focus on non-academic activities is consistent with
the hypercommercialized and professionalized nature of Power-5 college sport (Southall
et al., 2014; Southall et al., 2015; Southall et al., 2008; Southall, Southall, & Dwyer,
2009).
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Previous research has revealed that athletic role engulfment is widespread among
Power-5 profit athletes.11 Athletic role engulfment is associated with a variety of negative
outcomes among these athletes, including: increased academic dysfunction and lagging
graduation rates (Adler & Adler, 1985; Corr et al., 2019; Corr, Eckard, et al., 2020;
Snyder 1985; Southall et al., 2015), post-athletic transition difficulties (Kidd et al., 2018),
misogynistic and homophobic attitudes (Curry, 1991; Southall et al., 2010; Southall,
Nagel, et al., 2009), body-image shaming (Steinfeldt et al., 2011), ignorance of serious
injury (Nixon, 1992), and increased alcohol consumption and binge-drinking behaviors
(Leichliter et al., 1998; Martens et al., 2006).
This study extends previous research to investigate whether and to what extent
there is evidence of institutionalized athletic role engulfment among Power-5 collegefootball recruiters. While much attention has been focused upon recruits, and the
practices implemented to earn their commitment, there has been little – if any –
systematic examination of the institutional work performed by Power-5 football recruiters
who construct and maintain the institutional mechanisms (e.g., material practices and
symbolic constructions, espoused beliefs, policies & procedures) reflective of a Power-5
football institutional logic. By design, the emphasis during campus visits on social,
entertainment, and athletic-related activities – at the exclusion of education-related events
– conveys to future institutional members (i.e., recruits) an athletic-focused Power-5
institutional logic. Since recruiters plan, organize and manage the recruiting process,
including campus visits, this study sought to answer the following research questions:

11

Profit athletes are NCAA college athletes whose estimated market value exceeds the value of NCAA-approved
compensation (i.e., NCAA Bylaw 15.02.5 “A full grant-in-aid [GIA] is financial aid that consists of tuition and fees,
room and board, and required course-related books.”).
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•

Consistent with the theory of role engulfment, are SEC football recruiters,
who ostensibly have the same three roles within intercollegiate athletics as
players (i.e., academic, athletic, and social), engulfed in their athletic
“recruiter” role?

•

In this athletic role, do SEC football recruiters perform institutional work that
constructs, supports and communicates Power-5 football institutional logic?
Theoretical Frameworks

Role Engulfment
Within personal interactions or experiences, actors assume a role or roles aligned
with socially accepted actions and behaviors associated with membership in a specific
group (Biddle, 1979, 1986). Role theory outlines how an individual’s behavior reflects
learned and assumed role(s) within a specific social context or setting (Adler & Adler,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1991; Biddle, 1979; Miller & Kerr, 2003). Within this setting,
individuals display behavior that is linked to, and reinforced by, other group members.
Behavior associated with an assumed role is taught to new members, who learn and
replicate such actions (Biddle, 2013). Glorification of a specific role within this context
can lead to role dominance (Biddle, 1979, 1986). Role dominance occurs when the
rewards of a specific role become so great (e.g., over-valued) that it becomes dominant
over other roles (Biddle, 1979, 1986, 2013). Consequently, other roles may be
abandoned, with an individual becoming engulfed in the now fully dominant role. Within
this framework, role dominance, abandonment, and engulfment exist within a reinforcing,
relational matrix. Tajfel (1978) noted an individual’s self-identified membership in a
social group has value and emotional significance to that individual. In this study’s
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context, the social group/institutional setting in which players, recruits and staff members
– and specifically recruiters – exist is an SEC football program.
According to the NCAA’s Principle of Amateurism, participation in college sport
“…should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social
benefits to be derived” (NCAA, 2019b, p. 3). It is important to note the NCAA and its
members maintain college sports serves a societally important non-commercial objective:
higher education (Alston v. NCAA, 2020). In the NCAA’s collegiate model, college
athletes are asked to maintain “excellence” in at least three disparate roles (i.e., academic,
athletic, and social). It is well established that Power-5 college athletes (including SEC
football players) are often engulfed in their athletic role (Adler & Adler, 1985, 1987,
1989; 1991; Kidd et al., 2018; Southall et al., 2015). It is theorized that – in part due to
institutionalized pressures – SEC football recruiters are engulfed in their athletic
(recruiter) role, which often precludes their engaging in meaningful academic endeavors
associated with their role as a university employee or social activities unrelated to the
total [football] institution in which they work (Goffman, 1961; Settles et al., 2002;
Southall & Weiler, 2014).
The Power-5 football industry has profound economic and social effects on
college campuses, as well as in local communities, states and regions in the United
States. However, SEC football members are usually physically and socially isolated from
other sports within the athletic department, as well as academic departments across
campus (Southall & Weiler, 2014). For a number of reasons (e.g., status associated with
recruiting a possible All-American and/or NFL prospect, earning bonuses for recruitingclass rankings and on-the-field success, and promotions within the program), it is
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theorized SEC football recruiters become engulfed in their athletic role (Adler & Adler,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1991). When an individual is engulfed in a dominant role, other
preexisting roles are often cast aside or abandoned. Such role engulfment is exacerbated
by the elevated status of Power-5/SEC football in American and – specifically – Southern
culture (Branch, 2011). As former NCAA President Myles Brand noted, “…college
sports can be a cultural game changer in the United States” (Wimmer Schwarb, 2018,
para. 2). For many fans, SEC football is a cultural tie that binds families, generations,
communities, and an entire region (i.e., the Southeast).
Numerous scholars have described Power-5 football and men’s basketball players
as commodified entertainers who generate significant revenue for their universities (Sack
& Staurowsky, 1998; Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). Not surprisingly, the NCAA
national office lauds the revenue-generation capacity of these players, noting the revenue
produced by NCAA profit-athletes “...translates into non-revenue sport opportunities for
the vast majority of those who participate in NCAA sports – annually more than 460,000
young men and women” (NCAA, 2014, para 5). Fortunately, according to Dr. Mark
Emmert, NCAA President, “…for these athletes the [college athletic] experience is
exactly what it is intended to be: a meaningful extension of the educational process”
(NCAA, 2014, para 5). It is the responsibility of SEC football recruiters to identify,
recruit and sign talented football players who, through their football skills, in turn
generate the revenue that provides athletic and educational opportunities for the hundreds
of thousands of young men and women of whom Emmert identifies.
Within this setting, we theorize recruiters, just as profit-athletes, focus on their
athletic, revenue-generating role (Adler & Adler, 1989, 1991; Corr, Southall, & Nagel,

44

2020). This institutionalized athletic role engulfment reflects an institutional logic
supported and maintained through institutional work performed throughout Power-5
college sport, including athletic departments (e.g., Sports
Information/Communications/Public Relations, Development, New and Creative Media,
and Marketing), conference offices and conference television networks (e.g., The SEC
Network).
Institutional Logic Theory
Within an institutional setting (e.g., Power-5 college sport, SEC football)
members’ behaviors are produced and reproduced within organizational structures, which
serve to rationalize such actions by reference to an established set of material practices
and symbolic constructions. This institutional logic is available for elaboration by
individuals within the institutional field. Jepperson (1991) described an institutional logic
as “the rules of the game” (p.143) that define, mold and shape institutional actors’
behaviors, and which are established when informal rules or social patterns become
embedded in internal policies and procedures, central authority systems or cultural
constructs. Through the communication of these “rules” to new institutional members and
relevant stakeholders, the logic propagates itself. Thornton and Ocasio (2008) contend
institutional actors often incorporate a dominant logic into everyday decisions and
behaviors. As institutional actors become engulfed in a role that has been adopted and
deemed acceptable, their role engulfment becomes institutionalized and viewed as not
only acceptable but expected and valued. Such engulfment becomes an institutional logic,
an established precedent for future advancement (Southall, Southall, & Dwyer, 2009).
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The institutional field of college sport has been examined by several theorists
(Corr, Southall, & Nagel, 2020; Nite, Ige, & Washington, 2019; Nite, & Washington,
2017; Southall et al., 2014; Southall et al., 2008). Recently, a Power-5 college sport
institutional logic has been identified (Corr, Southall, & Nagel, 2020; Nite &
Washington, 2017; Southall et al., 2014; Southall et al., 2008), within which Power-5
college recruiters fulfill an institutional role often requiring a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-aweek commitment. One of a recruiter’s primary roles is clearly communicating a team’s
core values and mythological ceremonial facades to recruits (Corr, Southall, & Nagel,
2020).
An institutional logic affects organizational actors’ roles, relationships, and
routines (Lawrence et al., 2011). Notably, an institutional logic does not arise
spontaneously but is the result of institutional work performed by organizational and
institutional actors in their assumed roles. Such work occurs within existing institutional
structures, and offers a framework that simultaneously produces, reproduces, and
transforms an institution’s values, as well as the assigned or assumed roles of individual
actors (Lawrence et al., 2011). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) noted that influential
institutional leaders often actively create, maintain, disrupt and recreate such frameworks.
However, while leaders may transform or recreate an institution, it is up to others (in this
case, football recruiters) to maintain and/or recreate existing structures, while
simultaneously communicating an institutional logic to prospective institutional members
(i.e., recruits).
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Institutional Role Engulfment
Recruiters’ institutional work takes place before, during, and after scripted official
visits during which a recruit’s expected institutional role is elaborated (Corr, Southall, &
Nagel, 2020; Nite et al., 2019). Consistent with role theory, official football recruiting
visits provide an institutionalized outline of the dominant role a recruit is expected to
assume within the team. Through this process, goals are rationalized and methods for
achieving these goals are outlined (Scott, 2005). While athletic departments are – in many
ways – independent institutional entities, the same can be said about Power-5 football
programs. Given this reality, as Southall et al. (2005) and Schroeder (2010) noted, college
athletic departments do not possess a single set of departmental values. As has become
clear during the COVID-19 pandemic, within Power-5 athletic departments there are
competing priorities, with sports competing with each other for primacy when faced with
shrinking revenue streams. The 2020-21 college sport financial crisis – brought on by a
pandemic – has exposed long-standing competing department priorities.
Partly as a result of their being the revenue generators upon which the entire
college-sport industry depends, Power-5 football and NCAA Division I men’s basketball
players and staff are members of an organizational subculture within Power-5 athletic
departments (Santomier et al., 1980; Southall et al., 2005). Indicative of the need to
protect revenue streams, even in the midst of a generational corona-virus pandemic,
Power-5 athletic departments have done everything possible to make sure football and
men’s basketball games are played and televised. In an attempt to return to normal as
soon as possible, many departments opened stadiums, recognizing the importance of
television audiences seeing fans (even socially distanced ones) in the stands. As members
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of Power-5 athletic departments, recruiters work to maintain and support a Power-5
institutional logic that prioritizes football and men’s basketball, and encourages players,
coaches and staff to become engulfed in their institutionalized roles. Over the past 10-15
years, the competing values (i.e., institutional logics) of revenue and non-revenue
programs within Power-5 athletic departments have become apparent (Southall et al.,
2005; Southall et al., 2008; Southall, Southall, & Dwyer, 2009; Southall et al., 2014). As
was identified nearly 20 years ago, “big-time” (e.g., Power-5) college football and men’s
basketball programs are – in many fundamental ways – different from all other college
sport programs.
The University of Alabama’s head football coach, Nick Saban, is an example of
an organizational leader whose institutional work is re-creating and replicating an
institution’s logic through the introduction, dissemination, and insertion of a single
organization’s performance script across an institution’s consciousness. While Alabama
football has a long and storied history, Saban has led the Crimson Tide to unprecedented
– almost mythical – success. Since 2012, Saban and Alabama’s blueprint for success
(which includes a coordinated focus on recruiting, strength training, and the use of sports
consultants and psychologists) has become the “model” which all SEC football programs
seek to replicate. This modeling is an example of organizational replication within an
institutional field (Nite & Washington, 2017). Within the SEC, emulating The ‘Bama
Way or The Saban Process has become standard operating procedure, with all other SEC
football programs working to replicate Alabama’s “successful” practices and operations.
The pursuit of this standard has influenced personnel decisions throughout SEC football.
During the 2020 season, an examination of publicly available online media guides
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revealed seven of the other 13 SEC football programs employed a director or coordinator
of recruiting who has worked under Saban. Such replication is to be expected, given the
importance of recruiting and Alabama’s record of recruiting success (Caro, 2012; Caro &
Benton, 2012). Organizational actors not only seek to replicate organizational practices
when transplanted into new locations, but also, often unknowingly, transmit the dominant
institutional logic to the new organization (Cullen et al., 2004; Zhou, 2010). Former
Saban recruiters attempt to duplicate Alabama recruiting practices, which are part of a
taken-for-granted “Alabama” institutional logic. Such copy-cat practices are consistent
with the theory of institutional work, since institutional actors who benefit from currently
accepted institutional scripts tend to work to maintain their favorable positions (Nite &
Washington, 2017).
Southeastern Conference Football Recruiting
SEC football recruiting is impacted by technical forces that shape the “core”
functions (e.g., work units, coordinated arrangements and duties of recruiters who are “in
the trenches”), as well as institutional forces that reflect more peripheral structures (e.g.,
managerial and governance systems imposed by the NCAA governance structure) (Scott,
2005). Within SEC football recruiting, some institutional requirements (e.g., NCAA
recruiting-related bylaws) are strongly backed by authoritative agents or effective
surveillance systems and sanctions (e.g., NCAA, Conference, and/or athletic department
compliance offices). Recruiters’ responses to such forces will vary, depending on which
elements are predominant: external controls (e.g., surveillance and sanctions) or
internalized processes that rely on organizational actors holding deeply set beliefs and
assumptions (Scott, 2005). External controls – in the absence of deeply set beliefs – often
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result in strategic deviant responses (e.g., bending, breaking or ignoring imposed rules)
(Santomier et al., 1980; Southall et al., 2005).
Corr, Southall, & Nagel (2020) found that during official recruiting visits,
organizational actors “work” to maintain and communicate institutional practices to
internal and external constituencies. Specifically, if one of a college-sport recruiter’s
tasks is communicating a team’s values to recruits, an official visit should include
opportunities to let prospective members know how institutional members communicate,
enact power, and determine what behaviors will be sanctioned or rewarded (Barley &
Tolbert, 1997). Within a football program, these unquestioned, taken-for-granted “facts”
are reproduced in performance scripts (i.e., official visit itineraries) whose purpose is to
introduce recruits to the football program.
Another important element of an official recruiting visit involves recruiters
determining whether recruits “fit in.” Consistent with Woolf et al. (2016), recruiters
develop and maintain a structure within which recruits are socialized into existing
institutional practices. Maintenance and communication of existent institutional norms
depends on recruits being exposed to and coming to embrace and internalize existing
institutional values communicated by recruiters.
While role engulfment involves an individual assuming one role over another, this
choice does not take place in a vacuum. Rather, this role engulfment is institutionalized.
The institutional setting in which these choices take place encourages individuals to
become engulfed in an institutionally-prescribed dominant athletic role. Their role
engulfment depends upon and supports (and is supported by) the behaviors of other
institutional actors. It is theorized that by their actions, recruiters – engulfed in their
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athletic role – encourage recruits to become engulfed in their athletic role. In this selfreplicating and reinforcing institutional setting, the institutional work performed by
recruiters reduces recruits’ institutionally-prescribed options to a narrow bandwidth of
possibilities, discouraging recruits from exploring or pursuing conflicting roles. While
recruiters view recruits as commodities that can help them be successful, recruits see
recruiters as gate keepers, who hold the keys to their NFL futures. With both potentially
engulfed in their institutionally-prescribed athletic roles, there is little room for deviation.
For both recruit and recruiter, career paths and reward systems have been
institutionalized and reinforced. The path to success has been clearly marked.
Recruiting and Institutionalized Role Engulfment
In SEC football, recruiting success often has multi-million-dollar ramifications,
since great players win championships and help generate significant revenue (Caro, 2012;
Kercheval, 2016, Langelett, 2003). As has become apparent in the wake of the COVID19 pandemic, Power-5 athletic departments – including SEC departments – are
disproportionately reliant on football to generate merchandising, ticket sales, and
television and media rights revenue (McEvoy et al., 2014) that supports non-revenue
sport programs and pays coaching and administrative staff salaries. Within this
environment, recruiting talented football players is crucial to an athletic department’s
overall fiscal success. Not surprisingly, all but three Power-5 football recruiting budgets
(see Table 3.1) annually exceed $1 million (Ching, 2018; Estes, 2019). “During the 2018
fiscal year, public schools in the SEC averaged more than $1.3 million in football
recruiting costs, compared with public schools in the Big 12 ($961,981), ACC
($938,424), Big-10 ($855,437) and PAC-12 ($708,750)” (Estes, 2019, para. 19).The top-
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three recruiting budgets (i.e., Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee), and four out of the top-six
(Texas A&M is #6) are all SEC schools (Flaherty, 2019). In addition, SEC programs, on
average, expense 30% more than the other Power-5 conferences on football-specific
recruiting (Brady et al., 2015). Such expenditures are not surprising given that in 2019,
the SEC led the nation in average football game attendance (72,735) (Vitale, 2019).
Given that the SEC spends the most of any conference on football-specific recruiting,
leads the nation in average attendance, and is historically recognized as the “strongest”
football conference, the conference’s emphasis on football is not surprising (Berkes,
2016). This emphasis is reflected in the SEC branding tagline: Here [in the SEC] “It Just
Means More” (SEC, 2017).
The importance of football recruiting in the Power-5 has been well researched.
Scholars have examined the relationship between coaches’ job security and signing toprated recruits (Maxcy, 2013) and the relationship between winning and recruiting
(Bergman & Logan, 2016; Caro, 2012; Caro & Benton, 2012; Dronyk-Trosper & Stitzel,
2017; Elliott, 2020; Langelett, 2003; Pitts & Evans, 2016). Most studies concerning
college football recruiting are directed from an institutional level - the effect recruiting
has on a specific institution - or what factors influence a high school athlete’s decisionmaking process. Kidd (2019) found that athletic role engulfment is prevalent among high
school football players and has negative academic and social consequences. While Kidd
(2019) acknowledged the recruiting process further engulfs high school athletes in their
athletic role, an examination of role engulfment among Power-5 football recruiters has
not been conducted.
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Corr, Southall, & Nagel (2020) found official visit itineraries among SEC football
programs emphasize athletic and social themes over academics. Such emphasis on an
official visit, an integral component of the recruiting process (Anderson, 2012; Lawrence
& Kaburakis, 2008; Letawsky et al., 2003), is a ceremonial facade designed to shift a
recruit’s focus from the real experience of being a college athlete (Corr, Southall, &
Nagel, 2020). In relation to athletic role engulfment, a recruiter’s greater emphasis on
athletics and social themes conveys to a recruit the lack of importance and value a
football program places on academics. Since recruiters don’t prioritize academics,
recruits – and eventual enrollees – are more inclined to abandon the academic role.
Due to the structure of official visit itineraries found by Corr, Southall, & Nagel
(2020), evidence may exist that recruiters are role engulfed as well. The current study
seeks to determine whether, and to what extent, SEC football recruiters are engulfed in
their assigned role. While there is strong evidence of role engulfment among college
athletes, there exists no investigation of role engulfment among Power-5 football
recruiters. Given the importance of recruiters to a recruit’s decision-making process
(Magnusen et al., 2011; Magnusen et al., 2014; Treadway et al., 2014), examining role
engulfment among SEC recruiters is an important undertaking.
Methodology
The SEC consists of 14 members, of which 13 are public universities. The
conference was chosen for this study’s research frame because SEC football is “the”
penultimate example of the NCAA’s collegiate model of athletics, in which “…amateur
defines the participants, not the enterprise” (Brand, 2006, p. 8). SEC football is highly
competitive, commercialized and professionalized, and recruiting is as intense as in any
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Power-5 conference. Not surprisingly, the SEC spends more money on football recruiting
than any other Power-5 conference (Estes, 2019, Flaherty, 2019).
Interviews with Recruiters
As in many organized sport settings (Adams et al., 2014; Gutierrez & McLaren,
2012), college sport – and college football in particular – adheres to an omerta (‘no one
denounce’) code of silence system, in which not speaking to “outsiders” is not just policy,
but also part of the culture (Adams et al., 2014; Gutierrez & McLaren, 2012). For years,
universities – and specifically athletic programs – have claimed almost total control over
player conduct and speech (LoMonte, 2020). The culture of college athletics has really
emphasized silence, with an emphasis on not “rocking the boat” or stirring up
controversy (LoMonte, 2020). Players are inculcated into how to act and what to say to
the press or any “outsider.”
The purpose of this study was to provide insight into the actions of recruiters in
their role as institutional messenger. Consequently, interviews with SEC football
recruiting staff members were conducted. Initially, all SEC football recruiting staff
members listed on SEC football program websites were contacted via email and invited
to participate in telephone interviews. No recruiting staff member responded.
Subsequently, follow-up phone calls were made, and one staff member agreed to take
part in a telephone interview. At the conclusion of that initial interview, Director of
Player Personnel – University A (Director-A) communicated that another SEC football
recruiting staff member was willing to be interviewed.
Subsequently, systematic snowball sampling, in which one interviewed football
recruiting staff member provided access to two additional subjects, resulted in the study’s
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(n = 4) participants. While to someone unfamiliar with the culture of Power-5 college
sport this study’s sample may seem small, it is actually quite robust, with the four
participants representing three (21%) SEC football programs. Three subjects held
Director of Football Recruiting (Director) positions. Each participant took part in a semistructured telephone interview that explored the recruiting process and official visits. In
response to strenuous demands that no information be traceable to them, their athletic
department, or university, all data has been de-identified to ensure participant anonymity.
While participants varied in age, all three Directors had over six-year’s experience
in their current position, while the recruiting coordinator had two-year’s experience. Two
participants identified as Black males and two identified as White males. Of the four
participants, two were former football players, with one having played high-school
football and another having played both high school and college football (See Table 3.2).
Coding of Interviews
Interviews were audio recorded and stored on a password-protected laptop. Audio
recordings were transcribed and checked for accuracy by each member of the research
team. Each of the recruiters was sent the transcript of their interview and asked to verify
both the verbal content and clarify the context of specific quotations they felt necessary.
Researchers relied on in-vivo coding to identify prevalent themes across participants.
Using in-vivo coding is preferable when identifying themes using participants’ exact
language. Axial coding was undertaken to group similar in-vivo codes (Creswell et al.,
2007). Between coding rounds, notes were compared for accuracy and agreement
(Thompson et al., 1989). Coding was conducted until data saturation was achieved.
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Findings
Recruits
The four interviewed recruiters were asked to describe the socio-demographics of
the players they recruit. There was a general consensus regarding recruits’ racial and
socioeconomic backgrounds. Director-A stated: “85% are Black. Out of that 85% that’s
[sic] Black, s***, 50% of them are, you know, single parent. I would say low
income…that’s who plays [football].”
Director-B noted:
A 100% lower-class. Low-income homes, single parents, sometimes no parents,
sometimes children. So ya, that’s basically the majority, I would say, of kids.
Definitely more African Americans on the colleges I’ve been at. I remember one
time, one of my recruiting classes we only had one, one White guy.
Recruiter-A stated:
The racial makeup of the team is like 80-85% Black…You know how there’s the
lower class in America? Generally, below that. Like I would say a decent
amount…maybe like 60-70% of them are lower class people. And that’s maybe a
conservative estimate, maybe it be [sic] like 80%. Some of them are like
legitimate poverty and pretty much had no home. Some of them are just poverty
and like just really struggled in their home lives. But that’s not all of them, I
mean, some people come from middle class environments. I don’t really know
any that come from like upper-class, maybe 1 or maybe like a couple. I mean like
.01% come from affluent family environments. I would definitely say, in
general…a large chunk of collegiate athletics is built on the back of taking elite
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athletes from very bad socioeconomic situations and making money off of them
by them playing a sport regardless of whether they can get an education or not.
Director-C stated: “80-90% African American…the talent pool of the, for whatever
reason the majority of athletes are African American, that is your recruiting base.”
When discussing recruits, three recruiters contended coming from a lowersocioeconomic background was a “positive” intangible for a recruit. Director-C noted:
More often than not they’re not from a financially stable home…it goes towards
the character evaluation, the upbringing [sic]. Coaches, they are big about
knowing about the parents and the homelife…if they’re a little rough around the
edges but have some manners to them that’s almost a positive because it means
they’re gonna play with a chip on their shoulder…they come in with a strong
work ethic because they see [football] as a way to succeed and how they want to
achieve their goals in life. Just to prove the haters wrong.
Director-B stated:
I feel like a kid that came up with nothing, they [sic] got a lot to prove. And I feel
like, in this sport, that’s what it’s all about. Trying to prove something to get my
momma out the hood, so, I don’t have to sleep on the couch anymore.
Director-C added:
It should be viewed more as an opportunity just like any entry level job is, you’re
not going to generate the same revenue as the higher-ups in a company. In a way,
I think that’s what the NCAA is, it’s a money maker. Any business model will tell
you that the entry level positions are gonna be compensated less…The
compensation can be adjusted as so, it’s in high demand for a scholarship. Just
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like the support staff jobs that are in high demand, you can bring people in for less
than what they should work for and it’s not, in my mind, necessarily wrong.
Essentially, each of the recruiters confirmed what many observers of SEC football
already “know” – the vast majority of recruits are Black and tend to be from a lower
socioeconomic background.
Recruiting
All recruiters shared similar sentiments regarding a number of topics. Each
indicated their program began recruiting players as young as 14 or 15 years of age.
Consistent with previous research (Anderson, 2012; Corr, Southall, & Nagel, 2020;
Lawrence & Kaburakis, 2008; Letawsky et al., 2003), each subject stressed a primary
recruiting goal was getting a recruit to visit their campus in order to develop a personal
relationship with the coaching staff. A relationship with the coaching staff was identified
as the single most important factor in a recruit’s decision. Director-A detailed the
importance of an official visit in helping build this strong relationship:
That is the whole f***ing [sic] point. If you can’t get a kid on campus, then you
aren’t going to get the kid. Your entire job, pretty much [that of] every single
fulltime staff member, is to try and work and get kids on campus so they can meet
with coaches.
Director of Recruiting – University C (Director-C) also expressed the importance of an
official visit: “If it’s not an official visit, it doesn’t tend to pull nearly as much weight.
Like if you don’t go on an official visit and you commit somewhere without taking an
official there? It’s kind of a shock.”
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The importance of a strong coach-recruit relationship was also noted. Director of
On-Campus Recruit – University B (Director-B) stated:
To the majority of kids, it is very important to get them on campus. For like
several reasons. I mean, parents seeing the campus. You got people [sic] that’s
involved with the kid that wanna see the campus. Kid wanna see the campus so, I
mean, it was important.
Consistent with Eklund (2020) and Klenosky et al. (2001), who found recruitment to be a
familial process, every recruiter talked about the importance of recruiting those who have
a close relationship with a recruit. Director-A also expressed the notion of the SEC as a
conference of replication:
Everybody’s trying to do the Saban Model…everybody’s trying to be like Saban
now. I went to Alabama and stayed there for two days and watched and learned
how they do stuff and I took some of those ideas back to here. I brought a few of
the ideas here that they like.
Replicating the recruiting success of the most successful program in the SEC (perhaps the
nation) was a consistent theme throughout all interviews.
Since a football recruit is – by definition – being recruited to play football, it
makes sense that much of an official visit will involve football-related activities. This
focus on a recruit’s expected athletic role was evident during all of the conversations with
recruiters. Recruiter-A noted:
They will absolutely go to a practice. They’ll go to like a gameday walkthrough
and stuff like, they’ll be there. They’ll pretty much try and have them with the
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team as much as possible on a gameday to pretty much show them like, ‘This is
what you’re gonna be a part of.’
As was evident throughout the conversations, communicating the importance of recruit’s
focusing on their athletic role was an assumption during all recruiters’ conversations.
Recruiter-A articulated the time commitment football players must make to the program:
“They simply put in substantially more time than any other sport. No sport even comes
close to how much time the football players commit to the team.”
Academics v. Athletics
Power-5 college football players often publicly state that academics plays a
crucial role in their choice of university, yet their ultimate recruitment decision is not
indicative of academics being a significant determining factor (Eklund, 2020). Supporting
this contention, official visit itineraries do not reflect academic focus. Director-B shared a
similar position: “The kids we recruit, academics is not high on the list of something they
wanna do when they come visit a school.” Director-A stated that the nature of the timing
of an official visit makes covering academics difficult: “A majority of [players] are
coming in Friday and leaving Sunday so when they get there on Friday, class is usually
over.”
A common theme among all four of the interviewed members was that the
academic component of an official visit is primarily for the parents. Director-B stated as
much:
I don’t feel like a lot of these kids are really interested in the academic part of the
actual college. I feel like that’s more for the parents. It’s usually the parents with
the most questions about academics.
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Director of Recruiting – University C (Director-C) concurred:
A school that’s in a Power-5 conference that doesn’t have the best academic
reputation? I doubt that they try to push [academics] too much…I’d say
generically it probably is geared more towards the parents because when you’re
dealing with 17-year-old kids it’s not their highest priority.
Director A’s language and tone of voice illustrated a level of frustration with having to
provide an academic component as part of an official visit: “You gotta hit
academics…the f***in’ [sic] academics.” Each recruiter used the phrase “bare
minimum” when discussing players’ academic standing. A common theme among
recruiters was that football players struggle academically. Director-B:
I feel like most of your kids have academic issues. I feel like almost the majority
of recruiting classes in the nation, I would say, has more than half of their kids
are, you know, they got some type of red flag in the classroom [sic]. ‘Cuz [sic] a
lot of these kids these days they not even taking the right class that would make
them NCAA qualified…if you trying [sic] to go to college and play sports and
you not taking the right classes then you kinda just out there in high school just
having fun.
Director-C described the importance of recruits being able to be admitted to the
university: If they can get in without us doing any extra stuff for them, that is what we
look for…as long as you can qualify, we’re good with it. Director-A also highlighted the
importance of a player being admitted to the university: “Academics are the most
important thing because without academics they can’t get into school…they need to have
the minimum requirements to get in.” Director-A went on to discuss the importance of an
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athlete’s academic standing upon enrollment: “It’s very important because without
academics they’re not eligible and then if they’re not eligible you get hit with the APR
[Academic Progress Rate]. Now you lose scholarships, visits, and all that. They need a
2.0 [GPA] to be eligible.”
To recruiters the concept of “academics” had little – if anything – to do with an
athlete’s education. It involved mitigating the likelihood of poor academic performance
(i.e., low grades and/or ineligibility), which would have a negative impact on the football
program. Discussions of “academics” were really conversations about admissions,
eligibility and management of academic metrics (e.g., Graduation Success Rate [GSR]
and APR). The first academic hurdle was getting a recruit admitted to the university.
Director-A discussed the inherent fluidity of the admissions process:
It depends on how good he is. If he got minimum requirements and he’s a threestar kid that’s a marginal player, they’re not gonna fight for him. If he’s a, s***,
[sic] high major five-star kid, you know, they gone do [sic] whatever it takes to
get him [admitted]. Some kids that are low-level they may have a 2.3 [GPA] and
an 800 [SAT] which is barely [qualified for admittance]…and the school may say
‘f*** [sic] no because he’s not gonna be successful here’ but the coach may go in
and say, ‘I want this kid in…he’s gonna be one of the one’s I fight for.’ Some of
them [will admit the recruit] as long as the [coach’s] track record is good.
Consistent with the findings from a recent in-depth analysis of official visit itineraries
(Corr, Southall, & Nagel, 2020), recruiters admitted to a greater emphasis on athletics
during an official visit. Director-B stated:
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[A recruit] will sit down with a professor depending on what major they
are…[for] maybe ten, twenty minutes…the head coach is the last person that he,
you know, kinda sit down and talk to before he get out of town [sic]. It could go,
you know, an hour. It could go for however long the coach kinda want [sic] it to.
Director-A shared a similar sentiment:
They’ll meet with…tutoring people…academics, you know, they’ll meet with all
them [sic] people…[for] 30 minutes. During the visit you’re gonna meet with
your position coach…your area coach and then you’ll probably meet with the
coordinator. They’ll meet with equipment, weight room, training, nutritionist.
They’ll also meet with…the player development guy, life-skills guy. Kids
[choose] schools off relationships.
This need to introduce recruits to a variety of institutional members was another
consistent theme present in all interviews.
Supporters of the current collegiate model often describe an athletic “scholarship”
as a priceless opportunity for a college education. Director-A expressed this exact
sentiment – and more: “You getting [sic] an education…meals, you getting gear, you
getting travel, you getting sex, you getting, you getting everything…what you’re getting
is priceless.”
Notably, an “education” is only one component of a priceless package of benefits.
Director-A also discussed recruits’ choice of academic major: I would say 50, 60% of the
kids know what they wanna major in. And then the other 40% are placed in certain
majors. Probably general studies or, you know, something where they can get a degree.
Director-B also discussed major selection:

63

I don’t think that a university will, you know, kinda make a kid, you know if a kid
wanna be an engineering major or a business major, I mean they would probably
be like, ‘Hey it’s not probably in your best interest.’ [sic]
Recruiter-A stated the dichotomy between success in academics and athletics:
I think it’s like one in a thousand are gonna be legitimately good students if
they’re like good players on the team… I think it’s the requirements that go into
being a football player, and I think that’s specific to football…like I think if you
are a top-level talent football player and you are putting everything you can into
football, I think the idea that, because being a football player in the SEC is more
than a fulltime job, so to then expect to be a top-level student? [sic] Like it can be
done, I’m not saying it can’t be, but I think it’s a thousand times harder and you
have to be like, be way smarter than a normal kid would in order to balance that
schedule, and also a lot of the times they aren’t, because they’ve been pushed
through from grade to grade because they’re elite athletes.
Recruiter-A went on to discuss the opportunity for an education afforded college football
players:
The whole idea that they’re playing for their education is ridiculous considering I
think very few of them get a quality education, even if they’re at a good school
because, and again this is specific to football, those hours. I mean FBS football,
like legitimate football, you are putting, those players are putting in probably 80100 hours a week on football. So, I think to then expect, I mean I don’t know,
maybe like a normal class schedule like in terms of homework and what you have
to put into it, is generally something like 30-40 hours something like that. And
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then especially if you take, a lot of the time you’re taking kids from poor
economic and academic backgrounds it’s going to take even more work for them
to be successful students. Like I think the fact, like saying that they are playing
for an education is bull**** because most of them aren’t getting a f***ing
education [sic].
The feeling among recruiters that SEC football players do not have real access to
meaningful educational opportunities was not an unexpected finding, but was
disconcerting, nonetheless.
Transitioning from a discussion of educational opportunities, to another
academically-related topic, Recruiter-A discussed the role faculty members play in
football players’ academic success:
I think overall it might honestly be somewhat of like a pity thing and like a
teacher’s duty type of thing that like, not a duty to the school but honestly like a
duty to that player to a degree because they, I think most teachers know “this kid
has been pushed along and isn’t really smart enough to be here,” to be honest a lot
of the time. Or it might be that they know they are really busy and have all this
other stuff going on so they’re like kind of taking pity and being ok with trying to
help them out more and kind of making it their duty to be like “Ok, I want to help
this person succeed because no one else has.” Teachers take it upon themselves to
try and be better people. And then I do, I don’t think it’s so much a conscious
decision to let players be eligible, I think honestly, it’s just like an unconscious
decision of like “Ya, I’m just gonna help this guy out. I get he’s busy, I get he has
other stuff.” It’s not a conscious school wide thing of “keep this kid eligible.”
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While each subject expressed the importance of the official visit, Director-A expressed
the ultimate purpose of an official visit: “When a guy comes on campus [for an official
visit] you wanna show him something…the official visit should be a party.”
Recruiting Coordinator – University A (Recruiter-A) crystallized the social nature
of an official visit:
[We’ll] do like normal bull**** stuff that the parents can go to, like going
bowling and just like showing them the campus. Showing them the beauty of the
campus and like what a day in the life of the campus would be and then, you
know, then the players will take them out, and stuff like that, and show them a
good time. They’ll take them out to bars and clubs, I mean also it depends on the
kid…some of them will go out with the players, like wherever the players happen
to be going out to that night, the OVs [official visits] will sometimes just tag
along with them, you know, and that is also by design, it’s one of those things
that’s, “Hey you’re going to hang out with this player? We don’t wanna know
what you’re doing.” Because then you become liable for it.
Individual components of the official visit that are regulated by the NCAA must be
commensurate with the experiences of a typical athlete at an institution (NCAA, 2019b,
Bylaws 13.6.6; 13.6.7.7). In addition, the NCAA contends an official visit should give
athletes an idea of what to expect upon enrollment at an institution. With this in mind,
Director-A noted the importance of showing recruits where they will live:
You gotta [show] them off-campus apartments because at the end of the day a lot
of kids are not gonna, especially here, kids are not staying in the dorms here. [At
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other programs] they got nice-a** [sic] apartments, so kids, some people will stay
there.
During their on-campus tour recruiters communicate to recruits that they will live, eat,
and train in a privileged environment (e.g., off-campus apartments, football facilities, and
academic support centers) that inherently separates them from the rest of the general
student-body, akin to Goffman’s total institution (Southall & Weiler, 2014). Recruiter-A
noted this differentiation:
Definitely it’s like known, “Hey, they’re football players. We are going to treat
them better and help them out with things.” It’s not the rules don’t apply to them
but there’s definitely a 1000% more of a willingness to try and help them be semisuccessful, you know…just like on campus and in the classroom, they definitely
are treated different than the rest of the students.
Other Themes
Given the infantilizing language recruiters in this study used, it is not surprising
that Director-C identified players’ age (i.e., immaturity) as a primary reason why college
football players should not receive any compensation beyond their “full-ride” scholarship
(i.e. GIA). Given the racial, financial, and social disparities as well as the time demands
of being a football player in the SEC expressly acknowledged by recruiters in this study,
it is of note that the three recruiters holding Director (i.e., leadership) positions
adamantly opposed Power-5 football players receiving compensation beyond the value of
a GIA. The reasoning behind this opposition aligns with the SEC football institutional
logic. Director-A clearly stated the current level of player compensation was more than
adequate:
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Athlete A, who has a 2.3 [GPA] and a 700 SAT is not getting into [University
A]…So when you getting an education, you getting meals, you getting gear, you
getting travel, you getting sex, you getting, you getting everything…what you’re
getting is priceless [sic].
When asked if football players should receive greater cost-of-attendance stipends than
other athletes, Director-A continued:
I never believed in that spot because they say a hundred thousand people are not
going to watch a science project. Well, that science project student is the reason
that [University A] is a top-ten school. And that’s the reason that people come to
the school. It’s because not only its athletic, because of the academic part and
that’s what they sell…[all athletes] are putting in the same amount of work.
When asked if football players were treated differently and/or had a different experience
than other athletes. Director-A continued: “Oh, most definitely. Because they, they are
the face of the school. Ya, they [sic] the face of the program so everything they do is
magnified. You know. And they’re expected at a certain standard.” Director-B agreed
that football players, since they generated the most revenue, were treated differently than
other athletes and enjoyed a semi-celebrity status on campus. While recognizing football
players’ increased visibility, both Director-B and Director-C strongly were concerned
that any compensation beyond a GIA could potentially “ruin” the sanctity of college
football by creating “selfish” players who did not play “for the betterment of another
guy.”
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Discussion and Conclusion
The focus of an official visit, and the overall recruitment of an SEC football
player, is determined by the SEC football recruiting staffs (Corr, Southall, & Nagel,
2020). Reflective of the football-centric focus of SEC football official visits, recruiters in
this study openly acknowledged their engulfment in their athletic recruiter role. They
normalized practices that glorify the athletic role of SEC football players while
marginalizing their academic or education role. This study’s results offer evidence such
institutionalized practices are replicated throughout the SEC (cf. The ‘Bama Way or The
Saban Process). The institutional work performed by SEC football recruiters reinforces
their engulfment in their athletic role and communicates to recruits their expected
dominant role.
The institutional work performed by recruiters not only emphasizes the
importance of football, it also marginalizes academic pursuits. Recruiters in this study
viewed “academics” as a barrier, or obstacle, to completing their institutional work.
Specific language (e.g., “the f***in’ academics”) illustrates not only frustration with
having to make time for academics or education during an official campus visit, but a
general antipathy toward higher education. Recruiters in this study seemingly do not
value academics and view having to include an academic component during a campus
visit as a hindrance to successful recruitment of a sought-after player. Furthermore, the
importance of academic eligibility, not educational attainment, was consistently
expressed by several recruiters, and explicitly by Recruiter-C, who noted keeping
academically-underprepared players eligible was a program’s fundamental goal. This
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attitude reflects the degree to which members of SEC football programs have abandoned
a focus on academics.
The primacy of a football player’s athletic role is communicated to recruits during
the entire recruiting process. The institutional work of SEC recruiters (that communicates
the institutional acceptance of athletic role engulfment) has real-world outcomes, as
evidenced by the disproportionately negative academic outcomes of SEC football players
(Adler & Adler, 1985; Corr et al., 2019; Corr, Eckard, et al., 2020; Snyder 1985). These
negative academic outcomes are racialized, with the adjusted graduation gap (AGG) of
Black SEC players (-24.3) being significantly greater than those of White SEC players
(+5.0) (Corr, Eckard, et al., 2020). Since 83% of starting SEC football players are Black,
this racialized athletic role engulfment has a disparate effect on SEC football players of
color (Corr, Southall, & Nagel, 2020).
Engulfed in their athletic role, this study’s recruiters publicly praise the value of
the educational opportunity afforded athletes, while privately disparaging academics. Not
surprisingly, recruiters also construct campus visits in a manner that mythicizes the glory
associated with being an SEC football player. While recruiters in this study openly
acknowledged the inordinate amount of time football players must dedicate to both
football and academics, scheduled official visits minimize the academic demands
associated with being a “student.”
College football games typically occur on Saturdays and official visits
strategically take place over the course of a weekend to magnify the spectacle of SEC
football games. While the justification for weekend official visits is to minimize recruits
missing their own classes, it is notable that football, baseball, and women’s gymnastics
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are the only sports in the SEC to host official visitors exclusively on weekends (Corr,
Southall, & Nagel, 2020). In addition, “regular” students quite often visit campus during
the week to ensure they have an opportunity to see a campus, and realistically interact
with students and faculty (Lytle & Moody, 2020). Conversely, the overall message
communicated to a recruit during a weekend football official visit is that he is a football
player who also has many chances to “party.”
Consistent with this “party” atmosphere, the integral role of female hosts on
official visits has been well documented (Benedict & Keteyian, 2013; Bennett, 2009;
Thamel & Evans, 2009). The role of a female host during an official visit is often
associated with sexual commentary (e.g., “you getting sex”). This unspoken sexualization
of an official visit is part of what has been described as the omerta of college football.
This unacknowledged use of female hosts as enticements for recruits was mentioned by
Recruiter-C in the context of player hosts entertaining recruits on official visits. The
NCAA permits current player hosts to be provided up to $40 per day for the purpose of
entertaining a recruit on an official visit (NCAA, 2019b, Bylaw 13.6.7.5). Recruiter-C
illustrates the “design” of an official visit to release recruits with player hosts at the end
of each day to ensure that the football staff avoids becoming “liable” for any specific
action that occurs. The transfer of accountability from the football staff to the player host
and recruit promotes an environment in which members of the football staff relinquish
responsibility. This “design” illustrates recruiters’ desire to protect the football program
by constructing a code of silence.
A key component of higher education is exposing students to what they do not
already “know.” As has been ascribed to Plato and/or Socrates, “An unexamined life is
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not worth living” (Larivée, 2015). However, none of the recruiters in this study seemed
intent on providing the “students” they were recruiting an opportunity to explore various
educational opportunities. In this study, recruiters identified a lack of academic focus on
an official visit as indicative of recruits’ lack of interest in obtaining an education. The
phrase kids don’t care about academics illustrates that recruiters are engulfed in their
athletic role. This antipathy toward athletics reflects an institutional logic that devalues
educational attainment and fails to provide football players with the time and/or space to
“think” things through.
This minimization of academics is communicated to recruits and becomes a selffulfilling prophecy. Recruits are institutionalized to not care about academics because
recruiters have communicated this institutional logic to recruits during their interactions.
Recruiter-A illustrates the presence of an institutional logic within a university-wide
setting (i.e., football players need to be eligible to compete), and also the presence of role
engulfment permeating its way to faculty members representing the university itself.
Based on the statements made by Recruiter-A, athletic role engulfment could be a
campus-wide phenomenon in which parties at varying levels of the athletic department
and the institution itself are engulfed in a semblance of an athletic role.
During post-practice media availability in September 2019, The Ohio State
University quarterback Justin Fields made headlines by admitting he had rarely if ever
been on the Ohio State campus, except for time spent at the football training facility and
Ohio Stadium (Kinsey, 2019). While it may seem odd that a college athlete had never
stepped foot on campus, this wasn’t the first time a college football player revealed he
had rarely been on campus. In 2013, then Texas A&M University and Heisman-Trophy-
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winning quarterback Johnny Manziel revealed he was only on campus once a month
(Middlehurst-Schwartz, 2013). As a graduate student, during his two years at Louisiana
State University, quarterback Joe Burrow took almost all his classes online (Stacy, 2019).
This lack of interaction with campus or other students is indicative of the continuing
separation and segregation of college football players. This separation further alienates
players from campus, the student body, and faculty and contributes to players’
increasingly abandoning their academic role. In addition, academic admission standards
may be adjusted for college athletes (Olson, 2019; Taylor, 2012); these standards may
also vary within a sport as well, based upon athletic ability.
Consistent with the Power-5 football institutional logic, there is strong evidence
that SEC football recruiters are engulfed in their athletic role. In this role they clearly
perform institutional work designed to support and maintain an athletically-focused
Power-5 institutional logic.
Future Research
There are several areas that call for future research. One area is the consistent
infantilizing of football recruits and current players. The use of the word “kid” or “kids”
by recruiters in this study illustrates this consistent infantilizing. While an 18-year-old is
classified as an adult in a larger societal context, Power-5 football players are consistently
infantilized (Southall & Karcher, 2016). Barber (2008) states, “Adult athletes are treated
like children and behave accordingly; children are pushed to grow up into profitgenerating adult athletes as fast as possible” (p. 94). A singular focus on football
exemplifies recruiters’ desires that recruits assimilate into the dominant Power-5 football
institutional logic.
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Indicative of Power-5 college football’s institutional logic, Director-A visited a
program that has experienced an unquestioned level of success over the past decade to
replicate the practices they utilize. The NCAA itself acknowledged in response to Willie
Williams’ accounts of recruiting visits “a ‘keep up with the Joneses’ mentality” that
exists among NCAA members (St. John, 2004, para. 7). Similarly, Louisiana State
University head football coach Ed Orgeron noted in the lead up to the 2020 CFP national
championship that “[college football] is a copycat league” (Kubena, 2020, para. 42),
indicating an institutional logic shared at the national level among all football programs.
Research utilizing organizational theory in the context of the SEC could be valuable to
the field.
Additionally, the racialization of the recruiting process is extremely apparent
concerning the comments of recruiters in this study. Neocolonial comments regarding
Black recruits and their socioeconomic status and familial upbring illustrate the
leveraging of non-athletic related factors that recruiters employ to influence and hold
sway over recruits’ decisions. The insinuation of multiple recruiters that SEC football
players, a group predominantly comprised of Black males, are not “smart” enough to
balance the time demands to be successful academically and athletically deserves
systematic examination. The delineation between Black and White coaches regarding
recruiting responsibilities is another important area that needs to be addressed given the
language of recruiters in this study. Future research should examine the racialization of
the recruiting process in relation to recruiters and coaching staffs.
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Table 3.1: P-5 Football Recruiting Budgets, 2017-2018 Fiscal Year (Ching, 2018)
Rank

Program

Conference

Recruiting Budget

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Georgia
Tennessee
Auburn
Michigan
Alabama
Penn State
Kentucky
Nebraska
Notre Dame
Oklahoma
Ohio State
Florida
Arkansas
Florida State
Illinois
Texas A&M
Kansas
Texas Tech
Clemson
Duke
N.C. State
LSU
Indiana
Iowa State
Texas
Minnesota
Louisville
Oregon
Michigan State
North Carolina
Iowa
Baylor
Vanderbilt
Washington
Arizona
South Carolina
West Virginia
USC
Utah
Georgia Tech
Virginia Tech
Virginia

SEC
SEC
SEC
Big-10
SEC
Big-10
SEC
Big-10
ACC
Big-12
Big-10
SEC
SEC
ACC
Big-10
SEC
Big-12
Big-12
ACC
ACC
ACC
SEC
Big-10
Big-12
Big-12
Big-10
ACC
PAC-12
Big-10
ACC
Big-10
Big-12
SEC
PAC-12
PAC-12
SEC
Big-12
PAC-12
PAC-12
ACC
ACC
ACC

$2,517,452.40
$2,479,672.00
$2,461,960.00
$2,365,460.40
$2,314,326.00
$2,143,474.20
$2,131,701.40
$2,116,756.80
$2,069,652.20
$1,967,040.00
$1,867,262.00
$1,844,675.40
$1,837,537.40
$1,793,936.80
$1,787,241.60
$1,785,446.60
$1,730,998.80
$1,694,973.40
$1,664,950.00
$1,659,693.00
$1,657,498.20
$1,646,719.20
$1,645,962.80
$1,627,463.00
$1,594,832.60
$1,588,738.60
$1,588,149.00
$1,547,952.80
$1,486,227.60
$1,480,769.60
$1,473,247.00
$1,472,167.60
$1,442,988.40
$1,414,237.20
$1,411,078.00
$1,401,481.60
$1,389,010.80
$1,376,879.00
$1,374,675.80
$1,368,104.60
$1,364,785.60
$1,343,521.00
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43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Oregon State
Kansas State
Stanford
Purdue
Ole Miss
UCLA
Miami
Pittsburgh
Arizona State
Rutgers
Missouri
Mississippi State
Syracuse
California
Washington State
Northwestern
Wake Forest
Boston College
TCU
Wisconsin
Maryland
Colorado
Oklahoma State

PAC-12
Big-12
PAC-12
Big-10
SEC
PAC-12
ACC
ACC
PAC-12
Big-10
SEC
SEC
ACC
PAC-12
PAC-12
Big-10
ACC
ACC
Big-12
Big-10
Big-10
PAC-12
Big-12

$1,318,975.20
$1,306,997.80
$1,304,655.60
$1,294,840.20
$1,291,168.00
$1,275,200.40
$1,263,298.80
$1,235,892.40
$1,230,371.20
$1,208,702.40
$1,181,120.20
$1,175,758.40
$1,154,782.60
$1,098,657.60
$1,093,735.20
$1,072,704.80
$1,066,879.80
$1,045,621.20
$1,043,849.80
$1,033,421.00
$ 997,650.00
$ 912,495.40
$ 902,920.40
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Table 3.2: SEC Recruiters
Group

Age

Race

Years in
Position
4

Years in
Football
Recruiting
8

Former
College
Athlete
NO

Director of Player
Personnel – University A
(Director-A)

44

Black

Recruiting Coordinator –
University A (Recruiter-A)

24

White

2

2

NO

Director of On-Campus
Recruiting – University B
(Director-B)
Director of Recruiting –
University C (Director-C)

29

Black

2

6

YES

28

White

2

6

NO
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CHAPTER 4
THE NCAA’S DOMINANT INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC
AND THE LACK OF BLACK HEAD COACHES IN POWER-5 FOOTBALL
Introduction
During the 2020 college football season, there were a record number of minority
head coaches (n = 14 of 65; 22%) in the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) Division I, Power-5 “autonomy” conferences (NCAA, 2021). While the number
of minority head coaches in Power-5 football has increased the last five years (n = 11 in
2016) the number of minority assistant coaches has remained fairly constant. During the
2016 season 49% of assistant coaches in Power-5 football identified as a minority. By
2020, minorities have come to comprise the majority (54%; n = 272) of assistant coaches
in Power-5 football (NCAA, 2021). While each coach’s path to becoming a Power-5
head football coach is unique, possible causes for a proportionally lower number of
minority Power-5 head coaches is an area of research requiring further examination.
The adage “climbing the corporate ladder” describes the typical trajectory of
becoming a FBS football head coach. In the vast number of cases, an assistant coach
progresses from an entry level to an upper-level management position (Barnett, 2019).
Most coaches initially serve as a graduate assistant coach (e.g., completing a graduate
degree while gaining coaching experience). The next rung on the corporate ladder is to
become full-time assistant or “position” coach. Position coaches are responsible for
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coaching a specific group of “position” players (e.g., running backs, wide receivers,
linebackers) as well as recruiting future position players (Kulha, 2013). All position
coaches recruit both the position they coach and certain geographic regions (e.g.
recruiting areas) (Horne, 2013). Position coaches are tasked with forming relationships
with high school coaches and “developing pipelines to local high schools” (Horne, 2013,
para. 4). After serving as a position coach, a coach may progress to the position of
“coordinator.” Coordinators serve as a de facto “head” coach of the offense, defense or
special teams (Johnson, 2019; Kilgore, 2019). Serving as a coordinator is quite often a
stepping-stone to being hired as a head coach (Barnett, 2019). Given this traditional
trajectory, within Power-5 conference football, there are fewer minority head coaches
(21% in 2020), than would be expected based upon the number of minority position
coaches (54% in 2020).
Theorists have identified several barriers that inhibit Black football coaches from
being hired as coordinators and/or head coaches. Cunningham and Sagas (2005) found
that athletic administrators tend to hire coaches who resemble themselves. Interestingly,
in 2020, the percentage of Power-5 head football coaches who are White males (n =
79%), was exactly the same as the percentage of White male Power-5 athletic directors
(NCAA, 2021). Not coincidentally, since most Power-5 football head coaches are White,
more “successful” head coaches are also White, which leads to a bias toward hiring
White head coaches (Turick & Bopp, 2016). In addition, Turick & Bopp (2016) theorize
that Black head coaches are also expected to be successful recruiters, a duty traditionally
placed on assistant coaches, impacting Black coaches’ opportunities for advancement.
Given that athletic administrators inordinately value leadership, a trait ascribed to
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offensive or defensive coordinators (Turick & Bopp, 2016) when making head coach
hiring decisions, this study seeks to answer the following research questions:
•

Given that the majority of Power-5 football players (including a greater
percentage of starters who make a significant impact on the outcome of a
game) are Black, do the majority of Black coaches serve as the
primary/lead recruiter for Black recruits?

•

Consistent with previous research that socially-effective recruiters tend to
be more effective (Magnusen et al., 2011; Magnusen et al., 2014;
Treadway et al., 2014), do coaches recruit geographic areas that are
ethnically and socioeconomically similar to their hometown?

•

Given the importance placed on Power-5 football recruiting (Caro, 2012)
and previous literature on racial tasking of college football coaches
(Turick, 2018; Turick & Bopp, 2016), do Black coaches serve as the
primary recruiter for five- and four-star Black recruits)?

This study focuses on the relationship between recruiting and upward coaching
mobility of Black Power-5 football coaches. Guided by interest convergence (Bell, 2004)
and building on the work of Turick & Bopp (2016) this proposal will examine the
underrepresentation of minority head coaches in Power-5 football seeking to uncover
differences in the distribution of recruiting responsibilities between White and Black
position coaches and coordinators on Power-5 football coaching staffs.
Literature Review
Within the field of sport management, scholars have called for greater use of
critical paradigms (Frisby, 2005; Hylton, 2010; 2012), specifically Critical Race Theory
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(CRT) to examine ways to promote anti-racism in sport (Hylton, 2010). While sport
management literature is often stratified into individual subfields (e.g., sport finance,
sport marketing, etc.), Hylton (2010; 2012) contends CRT can provide a commonality
linking these subfields. Hylton (2012) argues that by not addressing race within sport
management, we perpetuate a societal norm that seeks to express color-blindness (i.e., a
choice to ignore racial issues) and devalues sport management research involving race.
Examining the intersection of race, coaching levels, and opportunities for career
advancement has potential implications across multiple subfields within sport
management. From a practical standpoint, examining the recruiting practices of Power-5
football staff members would determine whether such practices have contributed to the
racial composition of Power-5 college football.
Given criticisms of the NCAA, the positive benefits associated with participation
in college athletics can be overshadowed. In fact, many college athletes have nothing but
positive things to say regarding their college athletic experience (Potuto & O’Hanlon,
2007). College athletes develop time management skills and become part of a network of
professionals that often assists in the transition from college athlete into the workforce
(Menke, 2010). Another positive is the opportunity to receive an athletics grant-in-aid
that covers some to all of the costs of going to college (Bastie, 2018). In this sense,
college athletics could be looked at as the great equalizer as high school athletes from
low socioeconomic backgrounds may be able to afford to attend college and receive an
education they might not have had financial access too. College athletics can also provide
a pathway to success for high school athletes from low socioeconomic backgrounds.
Within Black communities, athletes often serve as role models for children. Stories of
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Black athletes achieving financial success through sports suggest college athletics is often
a stepping-stone to upward social mobility (Beamon, 2010; Rudman, 1986). Black
college football coaches are embodiments of the success and upward social mobility that
college athletics can provide.
While the positive outcomes related to college athletics are worth noting, social
conflict and racial undertones cannot be ignored. Power-5 college football programs have
been described as neocolonial plantations on which Black players and Black recruiters
are metaphorically viewed as slaves (Black players) and traders (Black recruiters), while
White coaches and administrators are seen as overseers (Branch, 2011; Hawkins, 2010).
In this analysis, predominantly White Power-5 administrators, head coaches, and
coordinators at Predominantly White Institutions (PWIs) reap financial rewards generated
by predominantly Black athletes (Branch, 2011; Byers & Hammer, 1995; Hawkins, 2010;
Southall & Weiler, 2014). In 1995, former Executive Director of the NCAA Walter Byers
described college athletics as reflecting a “neo-plantation mentality” in which coaches
and administrators act as “overseers and supervisors” that “own the athlete’s body”
(Associated Press, 1995, para. 3). Viewing college sport as a neocolonial institution is
consistent with critical race theory, which challenges the dominant ideology surrounding
college athletics.
Using critical race theory to examine Power-5 college football recruiting
acknowledges the intercentricity of race and racism (Bell, 1992, 1995; DeCuir & Dixson,
2004; Delgado, 2000; Ladson-Billings, 1998; Lawrence, 1995), the prevalence of
Whiteness as a property right, and the legitimization of racist practices within the United
States legal system and society at large (DeCuir & Dixson, 2004; Harris, 1995). Using
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critical race theory, several scholars have found NCAA governance justifies racist
practices (Agyemang & DeLorme, 2010; Cheeks, 2016; Hawkins, 2010; Hextrum, 2019).
For example, NCAA academic standards for admission disproportionately affect athletes
seeking enrollment at Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). As Cheeks
(2016) noted, Black college athlete applicants are often underprepared academically (i.e.
lower test scores) compared to their White counterparts. Broad NCAA admission
standards inhibit Black college athlete’s ability to enroll, let alone progress and complete
a degree (Cheeks, 2016).
Critical race theory recognizes the intersectionality of race and racism along with
other identities that are targeted, minoritized, disenfranchised, and oppressed (Cheeks,
2016; Crenshaw, 1988) and the principle of interest convergence (Bell, 1980; LadsonBillings, 1998). Critical race theory also utilizes: the art of counter storytelling and
personal narrative (Delgado, 2000; Ladson-Billings, 1998; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995;
Matsuda, 1991), an activist approach with the goal of implementing tangible social
justice initiatives (Crenshaw, 1995; DeCuir & Dixson, 2004; Ladson-Billings, 1998;
Yosso, 2005), and a critique of liberalism (Crenshaw, 1988; DeCuir & Dixson, 2004). A
coaching-interview mandate such as the Rooney Rule12 is a sport-specific, practical
example of abstract liberalism, which perpetuates colorblindness through practices that,
ostensibly, seek to provide equal opportunities for minority candidates, while
decontextualizing historical, cultural, and political factors that influence decision-making

12

Implemented in 2003 by the NFL, the Rooney Rule mandates that organizations must
interview at least one “diverse” candidate before making a hiring decision regarding a
head coach, general manager, or front office position (NFL, 2018). The National
Association for Coaching Equity and Development has asked that the NCAA adopt the
Eddie Robinson Rule, a proposal similar in practice to the Rooney Rule (Medcalf, 2016).
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(Bonilla-Silva, 2014; DeCuir & Dixson, 2004). In such instances, through the use of
tolerant language, the privileged group rationalizes their ignorance of race-related issues
(Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Bopp et al., 2019). In the context of coaching hirings, Bopp et al.
(2019) noted the “targeted” hiring of Black coaches in specific coaching positions may
actually be in the best interest of White head coaches, given the high number of Black
college football players .
Critical Race Theory
Gramsci (1971) applied the concept of hegemony in the context of a certain social
group’s authority over others. Hegemony operates without a direct military force but
rather is maintained through the consent of the people living, working, and interacting
within a given hegemonic structure. In order to maintain the status quo, codes of
everyday engagement demand, and receive, consent from societal members (Gramsci,
1971). In the context of critical legal studies, early scholars used Gramsci’s work to focus
on issues of class and socioeconomic stratification in the United States absent a
consideration of race. Critical race theorists emerged among critical legal studies scholars
by centering race at the forefront of critiques of jurisprudence that reproduced inequality.
Crenshaw (1988) acknowledges a racial hierarchy that assigns Black members of
society to a socially subordinate group. Within this hegemonic structure of race, the
opportunities and experiences available to a Black community are limited when
compared to a White community that has more advantageous societal positions. While
legal action continues to aid in reducing the number of overtly racist symbols, language,
and practices in the United States, the assignation of the Black community to a sociallysubordinate position continues, often perpetuated by strategic legal actions framed as
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altruistic (Crenshaw, 1988). While critical legal scholars analyze race in the United States
primarily through the lens of the historical ramifications of legal decisions, critical race
theorists seek to advance social discourse and stimulate research by exposing racist
practices and deeply-rooted racist beliefs (Lopez, 2003). The application of a critical race
perspective to various academic fields has advanced the dialogue surrounding racial
issues in the United States while highlighting the unique components of racism.
A central theoretical concept of critical race theory is the importance of individual
narratives that challenge the racial hegemony existing within society. Delgado (1989,
1995) called for counter storytelling in academic settings on the heels of Derrick Bell’s
work chronicling the lasting effects of Brown v. Board of Education (1954). According to
Delgado (1989), the dominant group within a hegemonic structure creates and
disseminates stories from generation to generation that serve to justify the dominant
group’s position. Therefore, storytelling that runs counter to that of the dominant group is
important in detailing racial disparities. Delgado (1989) noted the emotional components
of counter-narrative stories serve to create an understanding of a variety of lived
experiences. While White society has passed down stories that justify their continued
existence as the dominant group, Black society must share their stories as well in hopes
that the dominant group will hear and understand what it is like to be a Black member of
United States society. Counter storytelling can serve to close the gap between societal
groups. As Delgado (1989) states, “All movements for change must gain the support, or
at least understanding, of the dominant group, which is White” (p. 2440).
Bell (1976, 1995a, 2004) acknowledges a need for racial realism and
consciousness within United States society arguing that Black activists and leaders within
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Black communities must have realistic expectations when working toward social justice.
Racial realists acknowledge the permanence of racism, recognizing that social justice
initiatives need to focus on attainable change and not the impossible goal of ending
racism. Expectations of attainable change must be tempered by the historical, cultural,
and political forces that largely determine the position racial groups occupy within
American society. From this perspective, achieving absolute equality is unattainable
(Bell, 1995a). However, awareness of the United States’ racial hierarchy can inform the
continued fight for social justice. As Lopez (2003) noted, “…racism always remains
firmly in place but...social progress advances at the pace that White people determine is
reasonable and judicious” (p. 84). Understanding interest convergence and the historical
forces that have led to tangible changes is integral to formulating realistic, and attainable,
social justice initiatives (Bell, 1995a; Lopez, 2003).
Interest Convergence
A White society entrenched in a culture of segregation and the repudiation of
many lawmakers made enforcing the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board
of Education untenable across much of the Southeast region of the United States. In 1957,
Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus deployed the state’s National Guard to block the first
Black students attempting to integrate at Arkansas’ Central High School. Faubus
positioned the National Guard to prevent the nine Black students from entering the high
school for a month before federal troops intervened (Jaynes, 2020; Pattillo Beals, 1995).
In 1963, Governor George Wallace physically stood in a doorway at the University of
Alabama and blocked entry in protest of the enrollment of the University’s first two
Black students. Less than six-months prior during his inaugural address, Wallace
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infamously declared, “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever”
(Bell, 2013, para. 1). In Virginia, rather than move forward with the integration of
schools, politicians adopted a platform of massive resistance in 1956. Public schools in
many counties across the state were closed for up to 2-years while new private schools
received government funding and admitted only White students (Hershman, n.d.). Federal
intervention was required in both Alabama and Virginia to enforce the Brown v. Board of
Education decision.
In the wake of Southeast resistance to school integration, critical race theorist and
Civil Rights litigator Derrick Bell filed hundreds of desegregation cases across the
region. Bell’s experience working to ensure the enforcement of the Brown v. Board of
Education decision in the Southeast led him to theorize why desegregation was met with
such resistance and wasn’t effective. One such theory led him to coin the term interest
convergence. Interest convergence states that racial equality will only be pursued by the
racial majority when such equality serves the racial majority’s interests, or fulfills their
needs (Bell, 1980, 1992, 2004; Ladson-Billings, 1998; Milner, 2008; Milner et al., 2013).
Interest convergence succinctly explains that racial equality will only be pursued by the
White majority, when such equality aligns with the interests, wants, and needs of the
those raced White (Bell, 1980, 1992, 2004; Ladson-Billings, 1998). Interest convergence,
and critical race theory more broadly, is frequently found in the education-reform
academic literature (Castagno & Lee, 2007; DeCuir & Dixson, 2004; Milner, 2008;
Milner et al., 2013; Zion & Blanchett, 2011). Many critical race scholars have examined
college athletics, with some proposing sweeping NCAA reform (Cooper et al., 2017;
Hawkins, 2010; Hawkins, 2017; McCormick & McCormick, 2012), while others have

87

investigated the hiring and longevity of football coaches (Turick & Bopp, 2016), racial
tasking (Bopp & Sagas, 2014; Bopp et al., 2019; Turick, 2018), and academic success
among Black college athletes (Donnor, 2005; Harper, 2009). Outside of Hawkins (2010),
critical race theory has not been the framework for a study analyzing recruiting in college
athletics.
Bell (1980) argues that interest convergence explains the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Brown v. Board of Education. While the case is celebrated as a landmark legal ruling,
ostensibly ending segregation in public schools and promoting racial equality (as evident
by the iconic phrase “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal” [Brown v.
Board of Education, 1954, p. 13]), Bell (1980; 2004) argues that the Court was
influenced by other motives. Bell emphasized how the ideological war between
democracy and communism was heightened during the Cold War, which occurred at the
same time as many of the apex events of the Civil Rights Movement. Seeking to oppose
the rise of communism internationally, the United States government sought to minimize
images of domestic racial strife and inequality. Bell explains that the White House
administration sent white papers to the Supreme Court advocating for desegregation, not
on the grounds of justice and morality but rather to stem international criticism the United
States was receiving from allies and foes alike. The narrative of domestic racial equality
and tranquility following World War II was called into question by racial tensions in both
the North and South in the 1950s; and Black soldiers who had fought and died in World
War II protecting democracy against the ideological threats of fascism, communism and
socialism, returned home to be confronted with covert and overt racism. Bell (1980)
argued this historical national and international context resulted in the Supreme Court
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issuing a ruling openly acknowledging segregation was not only unconstitutional, but
also that it was wrong.
Bell (2004) noted that while Brown v. Board of Education resulted in the
desegregation of public schools, it also lessened the quality of education afforded to
many Black students. In the South, desegregation resulted in economic growth for the
White majority. Interest convergence challenges the illusion of empathy, morality, and
justice in racial reform. Racial reform occurs only when Whites recognize it benefits
them (Bell, 2004). Black organizing can attempt to leverage interest convergence but
ultimately, the racial majority decides which reforms are implemented.
Integration of SEC Football
College football in the South is as culturally engrained as any institution in the
region. Hall of Fame football coach Marino Casem described football in the Southeast as
“a religion, and Saturday is the Holy Day” (Hall, 2013, para. 4). Efforts to desegregate
society in the Southeast and the ever-present racial tension are directly part of the history
of SEC football. In fact, society and college football in the South resisted integration
hand in hand. By 1959, every major sports league in the United States had integrated and
by 1966 the most prominent college athletics conferences had integrated as well (Kirk,
2014; Oriard, 1991). The University of Kentucky was the first SEC school to begin
recruiting Black football players in 1966, signing 2 Black recruits that year (White,
2010). The first Black football player to participate in SEC competition was Nate
Northington at the University of Kentucky the following season in 1967 (Bembry, 2017).
The University of Florida began recruiting Black football players in 1968 by announcing
in mailers sent to high school football coaches across the state they would begin
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“recruiting athletes regardless of race…to recruit the best athletes possible from the state”
(White, 2010, p. 486). The University of Florida football program, however, enacted
admissions testing for Black recruits to, ostensibly, gauge academic qualification for
admission to the University. A Florida assistant coach reported that despite distributing
the admissions tests that no Black players met the “scholastic requirement” for admission
to the University (White, 2010, p. 487).
Hill (2004) noted the cultural prestige and power a head football coach holds is
amplified in the South. Especially given the history of racial tension in the Southeast,
there must be a certain level of comfort when hiring Black head coaches to lead SEC
programs (Hill, 2004). Accordingly, the SEC was the last major college athletics
conference to employee a Black head football coach, doing so in 2003 when Mississippi
State University hired Sylvester Croom (Longman & Glier, 2003; Zenor, 2003). Since
2000, there have been 63 SEC head football coaches. Including Croom, only 5 (8%) have
been Black13 (O’Gara, 2020). Ten of the conference’s 14 football programs have never
employed a Black head coach. While it has been over 30-years since Louisiana State
University hired John Mitchell in 1990 making him the first Black defensive coordinator
in the SEC, coordinator positions are still predominantly held by White coaches
(Alabama Sports Hall of Fame, n.d.). In 2017, Larry Scott became the first Black
offensive coordinator in the 121-year history of University of Tennessee football (Potkey,
2017). Subsequently reports claimed that then head football coach Lyle Allen “Butch”
Jones had only promoted Scott from tight ends coach to offensive coordinator to retain

13

Sylvester Croom (Mississippi State University), Joker Phillips (University of
Kentucky), James Franklin (Vanderbilt University), Kevin Sumlin (Texas A&M
University), and Derek Mason (Vanderbilt University).
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him on his coaching staff; Scott had developed a reputation as an ace recruiter and was
sought after by other programs (Climer, 2017). In 2020, the University of Florida hired
its first Black offensive coordinator when head coach Dan Mullen promoted Brian
Johnson from quarterbacks’ coach (O’Gara, 2020). The promotion, however, was
primarily an increase in title and not responsibility as Mullen maintained his role as the
offensive play caller. Given Johnson’s reputation as a top recruiter in college football
(Nettuno, 2020), the promotion to offensive coordinator may have been spurred by a
similar motivation to that of Larry Scott at University of Tennessee 3-years prior.
Johnson moved on to the NFL as quarterbacks’ coach for the Philadelphia Eagles in
January 2021 (Erby, 2021). Although SEC football is a predominantly Black sport in
both number of players and coaches, football programs in the SEC still grapple with
employing Black coaches in leadership positions on coaching staffs.
Racial Tasking
Racial stacking occurs in sport when athletes are segregated based on social
assumptions of perceived abilities determined by racial composition (Loy & McElvogue,
1970). Historically, the most prevalent form of racial stacking is in football where
segregation often occurs by position based off socially constructed views of athletes’
perceived intelligence and athleticism (Hawkins, 2002; Perchot et al., 2015; Pitts & Yost,
2013; Loy & McElvogue, 1970). Historically in football, racial stacking has been
prevalent at the quarterback position, where heightened awareness and overall
intelligence are crucial attributes. Quarterbacks are viewed as the most prepared player,
who must know the assignments and roles of the 10 other offensive players. Quarterbacks
are deemed to have the highest level of mental acuity with the ability to make split-
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second decisions (Kissel, 2013). Traditionally, quarterbacks have been White, because of
their perceived superior intelligence. Conversely, Black players have historically stacked
at “skill positions” where athleticism is considered the most valuable trait (Hawkins,
2002; Pitts & Yost, 2013; Schneider & Eitzen, 1986; Siler, 2019). While most commonly
analyzed in football, racial stacking has also been examined in other sports as well. At
many levels of competition, men’s and women’s basketball players have been racially
segregated positionally with the point guard position sometimes being viewed as a White
position (Berghorn, et al., 1988; Perchot et al., 2016). In women’s volleyball, the “setter”
position has historically been a position in which Black atletes are underrepresented
(Eitzen & Furst, 1989). In all three positions (i.e., quarterback, point guard, and setter)
leadership and intelligence are highly valued. Across sports, Black athletes typically
predominate (e.g., stack) in positions where strength, speed, and athleticism are valued
more than mental acuity and leadership.
In 2002, Hawkins reported an increase in Black athletes at the quarterback
position in college football from the 1970s to 2000. However, this increase in Black
quarterbacks was attributed to changes in the skills required at the quarterback position
rather than racial progress. As college football tactics and strategy changed, quarterbacks
who were mobile or “athletic” became more valued. Stereotypically, Black athletes
(stacked in the running back position) were perceived as possessing athleticism. While
the percentage of Black quarterbacks has continued to increase in college and
professional football, broadly speaking, the tasks Black and White quarterbacks are
expected to complete are different (Bopp & Sagas, 2014). Black quarterbacks often run
more and throw less than their White counterparts; an emphasis that illustrates the
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different tasks each are asked to complete (Bopp & Sagas, 2014). A schematic emphasis
on utilizing Black quarterbacks’ athleticism to rush rather than pass effectively tasks
Black quarterbacks as “skill” players playing the quarterback position, marginalizing the
traditional demands of playing the position. Bopp et al. (2019) note that tasking Black
quarterbacks to run more often “has the potential to hinder Black quarterbacks’ analytical
approach to understanding the game, increase their risk of injury, as well as limit the
development of their throwing skills” (p. 9). Each of these hindrances may serve to
devalue Black quarterbacks and negatively affect their professional opportunities
(underdeveloped understanding of the game and throwing skills) and their longevity
(increased injury risk) compared to their White counterparts.
In college football, coaches are racially tasked as well. While each assistant coach
has a similar title: “assistant,” a coaching hierarchy among assistant coaches is defined by
the role(s) each performs (Turick, 2018; Turick & Bopp, 2016). Turick (2018) noted that
in addition to on-field football roles, Black assistant coaches are often tasked with
recruiting players and monitoring them once they are enrolled as students. Tasking Black
assistant coaches with these additional and disparate roles may disproportionately inhibit
their opportunities for advancement (Cunningham & Bopp, 2010), since they are viewed
by head coaches and athletic directors as simply recruiters and “babysitters” and not
leaders capable of successfully managing all aspects of a football program (Turick &
Bopp, 2016). As Black and White coaches assume roles with differing emphasis, it may
serve the interests of White head coaches and coordinators to employ Black coaches in
recruiting-oriented positions, especially given the importance of recruiting in college
football.
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Institutional Logic Theory
The predominant institutional logic of the institution of Power-5 college football
and men’s basketball has been defined as jock capitalism (Southall & Nagel, 2009) in
which Power-5 athletic departments seek to maximize revenue within a hypercommercialized environment. Within an institutional field, institutional members learn
and recreate accepted behaviors, practices, and ideologies that serve to justify
institutional policies and practices (Jepperson, 1991). Within the institutional setting of
NCAA Power-5 college sport, Corr, Southall, & Nagel (2020) found that official
recruiting visits serve to communicate athletic departments’ dominant institutional logic
to recruits. Consistent with jock capitalism and the competing logics that exist between
higher education and athletic departments, official recruiting visits communicate a value
system that emphasizes athletics over academics (Corr, Southall, & Nagel, 2020).
Recruiters within individual athletic departments communicate this value system to
recruits during an official visit (Corr, Southall, & Nagel, 2021).
Institutions require a collective effort among actors to maintain and, if necessary,
adapt the dominant logic (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). In the context of college football
recruiting responsibilities, successful recruiting correlates to winning football games and
winning football games correlates to revenue generation (Caro, 2012). Within a culture
that values winning above all else (Santomier et al., 1980; Southall et al., 2005), Power-5
football programs seek to replicate an athletics-focused institutional logic (Corr, Southall,
& Nagel, 2021). Considering that Black coaches may be tasked with more recruiting
responsibility than White coaches (Turick & Bopp, 2016) and successful recruiting is
pivotal to winning football games (Caro, 2012), athletic administrators and head coaches
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may, unconsciously, maintain the institutional status quo by more often valuing minority
coaches as recruiters (Turick & Bopp, 2016). Such maintenance is consistent with
Battilana (2011) who found that institutional actors only seek to deviate from dominant
institutional ideologies given a divergent social position. Given that coaches are more
likely to hire coaches who look similar to them (Cunningham & Sagas, 2005), or who
perform a specific institutionally-proscribed role, the social position of head coaches, and
therefore the dominant logic, tends to remain constant.
Coaching Staff Structure
The NCAA permits FBS coaching staffs to have 11 members (one head coach and
10 full-time assistant coaches) (Johnson, 2017). Not surprisingly, the head coach is the
most “powerful,” followed by the offensive and defensive coordinators and,
subsequently, the remaining position coaches (R. Johnson, 2019). This power structure is
reflected in coaching salaries, with the head coach being the highest paid, followed by
coordinators (Berkowitz et al., 2019a; Berkowitz et al., 2019b).
In addition, while overall 48% of Power-5 football coaches are White, 78% of
head coaches and coordinators (i.e., those who wield institutional power) are White
(NCAA, 2021). While a head coach is responsible for overseeing all aspects of a football
program, a coordinator is tasked with leading their respective “side of the ball” (i.e.,
offense or defense) (Barnett, 2019; Donovan, 2017). Fundamentally, a coordinator is the
“head coach” of either the offense or the defense (Kilgore, 2019). Just as a head coach
hires coordinators to carry out his philosophy, coordinators are very involved in hiring
position coaches to carry out their philosophy. In many ways, a coordinator is an
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autonomous extension of the head coach, since coordinators supervise position coaches
(Donovan, 2017).
Not surprisingly, job responsibilities of head coaches, coordinators, and position
coaches vary, as does the perceived pressure, with pressure (as well as salary) increasing
as a coach moves up the proverbial ladder (Bender, 2020; R. Johnson, 2019). Since they
only coach their position players, position coaches have less responsibility and are
therefore subservient to their coordinator and the head coach (R. Johnson, 2019).
Conversely, an offensive/defensive coordinator is responsible for all 11
offensive/defensive players on the field at a given time (and, more broadly, the entirety of
offensive players). Since position coaches have more limited “game-planning” and onfield coaching responsibilities, they assume an increased recruiting load (Simmons, 2020;
Turick, 2018; Weathersby, 2014).
As even the NCAA national office recognizes, “Recruiting is not only the
lifeblood of any athletics department, but also a benefit to the entire campus” (NCAA,
n.d., para. 1). No surprisingly, since position coaches interact almost daily with fewer
players (i.e., players from their position), they have more opportunities to develop close
relations with these players. Consequently, the primary job responsibility of a position
coach is recruiting (Horne, 2013; Simmons, 2020; Turick, 2018; Weathersby, 2014).
Horne (2013) states, “all assistant coaches are recruiters and usually have a designated
area that they are responsible for...a region where they have established ties or developed
pipelines to local high schools and their coaches” (para. 4). Many times, a position coach
is assigned a recruiting area based on where he went to high school or college, as well as
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established connections and/or familiarity with high school coaches, athletes and their
families (Horne, 2013).
Given the locations that top recruits call home, coaches from specific geographic
areas or ethnic enclaves may be at a premium. Since 2009, counties serving major
metropolitan areas have produced the greatest number of five-star high school football
recruits; Los Angeles County (serving Los Angeles, CA) – 48, Broward County (serving
Fort Lauderdale, FL) – 38, Harris County (serving Houston, TX) – 26, Gwinnett County
(serving Atlanta) – 24, Dallas County (serving Dallas, TX) – 23, and Miami-Dade
County (serving Miami, FL) – 23 (Knox & Willis, n.d.). The counties producing the
greatest number of 5-star recruits can be seen in Figure 4.1. Institutions located outside a
close proximity of these hotbeds for high school football recruits seek to employ coaches
that can gain entry to strategic geographic regions (Schrotenboer, 2020). Given the
demographic composition of many recruiting hotbeds, Black coaches from similar ethnic
enclaves may be sought after by White head coaches and coordinators to gain entry to
specific geographic regions. The of University of Colorado football program for example,
“has a progressive reputation and a pressing need to recruit players from metro areas in
other states, where many players are Black” (Schrotenboer, 2020, para. 62). The
University of Colorado is 1 of 2 NCAA institutions (Stanford University) to have hired
more than one Black head football coach in its history. As previous scholars have noted,
socially effective recruiters maximize the likelihood of achieving their goal (signing a
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recruit to an NLI14) by establishing a comfortable relationship with a recruit, his coach
and/or his immediate family (Magnusen et al., 2011; Magnusen et al., 2014; Treadway et
al., 2014). Being from the same geographic area can establish a sense of familiarity,
which allows for the development of a level of comfort from the beginning of the
recruitment process.
Given this context, this study sought to examine the various roles that coaches
perform within the recruiting process utilizing a critical race theory framework, informed
by interest convergence.
Methodology
Research Setting
The SEC was chosen as the research setting based on previous work (Corr,
Southall, & Nagel, 2020; 2021; Glier, 2012), as well as it having the highest percentage
of both Black football coaches (50% in 2020) and players (57% in 2020) among Power-5
conferences (NCAA, 2021). Data will be collected beginning with the 2018-2019
academic year due to the NCAA rule change allowing for 11 full-time coaching members
in football (up from 10) in January 2018 (Johnson, 2017). Including 4 permissible
graduate assistants, coaching staffs in college football now number 15 total coaches.
Upon passing an annual NCAA recruiting exam, these 15 coaches are permitted to coach
current athletes and recruit prospective athletes (NCAA, 2017). The rule change allowed

14

Indicates an athlete has signed a National Letter of Intent (NLI), an agreement between
a recruit and an institution in which the recruit agrees to attend the institution for one full
academic year and the institution agrees to compensate the recruit by providing one full
year of financial aid.
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for head coaches to hire an additional position coach or coordinator; coaches with
recruiting responsibility.
Data
Recruiting Data
Recruiting success was determined based on 247Sports Recruiter of the Year
ranking. 247Sports, a subsidiary of CBSSports, is recognized as the recruiting industry
leader in determining recruiting rankings for high school football recruits (247Sports,
2012). Utilizing a composite ranking system, 247Sports calculates recruiting rankings
based on the average of multiple, widely recognized, recruiting services (e.g. ESPN and
Scout). A 5-star football player typically holds multiple offers from the most historically
powerful and prominent college football programs in the Power-5. Regardless of the
subjective nature of recruiting rankings, the correlation between number of stars (i.e. 5star, 4-star, etc.) and number of suitors (i.e. scholarship offers) makes signing a higher
rated recruit a useful means of determining the recruiting success of a coach.
Additionally, a correlation exists between signing 5- and 4-star players and winning
national championships in Power-5 football (Elmasry, 2017; Kercheval, 2016).
In addition to Recruiter of the Year ranking, a number of variables on SEC
coaches were calculated using data found on 247Sports.com. The Primary Recruiter is
the coach that is designated to lead the recruitment of a recruit and is primarily
responsible for their signing with a particular program. Knowing which coach was the
primary recruiter for each individual recruit is pivotal to examining each research
question. The total number of recruits in which a coach served as the primary recruiter
was collected to examine recruiting load (i.e. which coaches were responsible for signing
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the most recruits). The position, hometown, high school, race, and star-rating of each
recruit was gathered along with information on the total number of football programs to
offer a recruit a scholarship (Total Offers), number of official visits taken (Official
Visits), and football programs a recruit officially visited (Official Visits-Location). As
previously mentioned, recruiting rankings are an imperfect system but analyzing the total
number of football programs to offer a recruit a scholarship and if football programs are
hosting a recruit on an official visit is a more objective measure to determine how
coveted a recruit truly is by college football programs.
Census Data
Recruiting data was calculated from a variety of sources. The 15-member
coaching staffs at each institution were examined based off their demographic
background, coaching background, and recruiting success in the 2019, 2020, and 2021
recruiting classes. A college football coaching staff typically represents 1 head coach, 2
coordinators, 8 position coaches, and 4 graduate assistants. The demographic and
coaching background of each coach was identified using biographical information found
on athletic department websites and media guides. Socioeconomic background and
upbringing were determined based off each coach’s identified hometown found on
athletic department websites and within media guides and calculated using the most
recent United States Census Bureau American Community Survey (ACS) data
(https://data.census.gov/cedsci/). The most recently available Census data is from the
2010 decennial Census. While using Census data within the past 20-years is considered
statistically valid (Geronimus & Bound, 1998), the 2019 ACS provided more current
demographic information of geographic areas. The ACS has been found to be
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comparably reliable to the more robust United States Census (National Research Council,
2007; Yang et al., 2014). The United States Census database allows users to search the
most recent ACS data by entering the name of a city, county, or state. Coaches
demographic variables consist of each coach’s hometown: Median Age, Percentage of
High School Graduates, Median Annual Household Income, Percentage Living Below
Poverty Level, Total Population, Black Population, and White Population. Demographic
variables were used to determine the ethnic enclave and socioeconomic status in each
coach’s identified hometown.
Understanding the demographic background of recruits that coaches are signing is
an important layer to this study. The socioeconomic background of each recruit was
determined based on the geographic location of their identified hometown on
247Sports.com and calculated using the most recent ACS data. Recruits demographic
variables consist of each recruit’s hometown: Median Age, Percentage of High School
Graduates, Median Annual Household Income, Percentage Living Below Poverty Level,
Total Population, Black Population, and White Population. Demographic variables were
used to determine the ethnic enclave and socioeconomic status in each recruit’s identified
hometown. Since college football coaches are typically assigned to recruit a specific
geographic area (Casazza, 2019; Lee, 2020; May, 2012), identifying the socioeconomic
background of a specific geographic area a coach is assigned to is important when
examining recruiting from a racial perspective. Many athletic department websites list
recruiting areas for each member of the football coaching staff for the stated benefit of
high school coaches and recruits, illustrating the importance each coach has in recruiting
a specific geographic area.
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Biographical Data
Extensive biographical data on each coach was gathered from athletic department
websites and media guides. Title, Position, and Secondary Title were gathered to group
coaches during analysis. Title broke down into three categories: Head Coach,
Coordinator, or Assistant Coach. The variable Position identified which position group
each coach was responsible for coaching. Secondary Title consisted of any additional
titles a coach had (e.g. Run Game Coordinator, Associate Head Coach). Previous
coaching experience and coaching positions were gathered for all coaches in the sample.
Relationships among coaches on each staff were examined to determine if certain
assistant coaches were consistently hired to work for coordinators or head coaches. Given
that coaches in the SEC consistently work for multiple football programs within the
conference over the course of their coaching careers (e.g. Will Muschamp at Auburn
University, Louisiana State University, University of Florida, University of South
Carolina, and University of Georgia) (Levine, 2015), personal and/or professional
relationships may limit the opportunities for coaches outside the SEC to be employed
within the conference. Other collected variables included: Age, Race, College, Degree,
Coaching Experience [High School], Coaching Experience [College], Coaching
Experience [Professional], Head Coach Experience, Head Coach Experience [Age],
Coordinator Experience, Coordinator Experience [Age], Assistant Coach Experience,
Assistant Coach Experience [Age], Graduate Assistant Experience, Former Player,
Former Player [Position], Former Player [College], and Former Player [Professional].
Head coach, coordinator, and assistant coach experience by age was gathered to indicate
a coach’s age at first opportunity within each title/position. Analysis was run across these
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variables to determine if differences existed in the opportunities afforded to Black and
White coaches.
Analysis
Much of the data is descriptive in nature and individual mean scores of particular
variables will be used throughout the findings to illustrate differences between the
division of labor, if present, of minority and White coaches with relation to recruiting. As
it is theorized that increased recruiting responsibility placed on Black coaches negatively
affects opportunities for advancement (Turick, 2018, Turick & Bopp, 2016), analysis
were run to determine if differences exist between Black and White coaches recruiting
responsibilities and examine research question 1. Comparisons between hometown
demographic data of primary recruiting coaches and signed recruits were used to examine
research question 2. Analysis of coaches’ race and recruits’ star-ratings were run to
examine research question 3. For comparisons between variables, multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) was used to compare whether differences exist between
independent variables. Tukey’s HSD test was used as a post-hoc measure to determine if
variables were statistically significant. Tests of statistical significance (p≤.05) and
relevance were reported upon comparison between variables. Statistical comparisons
were calculated using the software package SPSS by IBM Business.
Positionality
As mentioned in the preface of this dissertation, I have professional work
experience working in the field of college football recruiting. While my firsthand
knowledge of recruiting practices and operations are valuable in conducting research I
have taken measures to avoid confirmation bias. By collecting data beginning with the
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2019 recruiting class, I ensured that I was not extensively a part of the recruitment
process for any of the recruits in this study as my final date of employment in a recruiting
position was May 2018.15 While I acknowledge that I have worked for and have had
personal relationships with coaches in this dataset, none of the data being collected is
subjective in nature and no internal bias can be found in the dataset.
Limitations
It is worth noting that using 2019 ACS data as a measure of the demographic and
socioeconomic background of coaches is not current as geographic regions have no doubt
changed over time. While the primary recruiter variable on 247Sports is essential to
answering this study’s research questions there is a confluence of factors that contribute
to a recruit’s enrollment decision. A knowledge of which coach was primarily
responsible for recruiting specific recruits is valuable but acknowledging the variety of
factors that contribute to a recruit’s enrollment decision is worth noting.
Findings
Racial Composition of Coaches
In total, 378 SEC coaches were examined from 2018-2021. During this span,
Vanderbilt University head football coach Derek Mason was the only Black head coach
in the Conference; Mason was fired during the 2020-2021 season (Schlabach, 2020).
Coordinators accounted for 18% of coaches (n = 67). Fifty coordinators were White
(75%) and 17 were Black (25%). Twenty-nine offensive coordinators were White (83%)
and 6 were Black (17%). Twenty-one defensive coordinators were White (66%) and 11

15

The 2019 recruiting class signed in either the Early Signing Period in December 2018,
or on National Signing Day in February 2019.
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were Black (34%). Black coaches comprised of 53% of position coaches (n = 112) and
White coaches made up 47% (n = 98). Seventy-three graduate assistants were identified
with 59% White (n = 43) and 41% Black (n = 30). White coaches accounted for 73% of
offensive graduate assistants (n = 24) and 38% of defensive (n = 13). Black coaches
comprised 27% of offensive graduate assistants (n = 9) and 62% of defensive (n = 21).
Three White graduate assistants coached special teams while 3 additional White graduate
assistants were not identified as coaching a specific position. A statistically significant
relationship exists between coaches’ title (i.e. coordinator or position coach) and coaches’
race (p < .001). White coaches examined in this study were more likely to be
coordinators than Black coaches. Racial composition of coaches is depicted in Table 4.1.
Background of Coaches’ Hometowns
Head coaches in the SEC were on average 50.7 years old. Coordinators were 45.6
years old with White coordinators averaging 46.9 and Black coordinators 40.4. Position
coaches were 44.9 years old with White position coaches averaging 45.9 and Black
position coaches 44.3. White position coaches and coordinators had been coaching for a
greater number of seasons (MWhitePosition = 22.6; MWhiteCoordinator = 24.2) than Black coaches
(MBlackPosition = 19; MBlackCoordinator = 17.5). The median age of position coaches’
hometowns was statistically similar for White and Black coaches (MWhiteAge = 36.4;
MBlackAge = 36.2). The median age of Black coordinators’ hometowns was greater than
that of White coordinators (MWhiteAge = 35.8; MBlackAge = 38.4). The median annual
household income of Black position coaches’ hometowns was $51,335, greater than that
of White position coaches (MWhiteIncome = $49,595). The median annual household income
of White coordinators’ hometowns was $50,323 and Black coordinators was $46,931.
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The percentage of high school graduates was statistically similar across all coaches
(MWhitePosition = 85.7%; MBlackPosition = 85%; MWhiteCoordinator = 84.3%; MBlackCoordinator =
85.7%). The percentage of coaches’ hometown population living below the poverty level
was also similar across all coaches (MWhitePosition = 21%; MBlackPosition = 20.9%;
MWhiteCoordinator = 21.1%; MBlackCoordinator = 20.9%). White position coaches were from
hometowns with larger overall populations than Black position coaches (MWhitePosition =
357,395; MBlackPosition = 223,598). The overall hometown population for coordinators was
similar for White (MWhiteCoordinator = 142,827) and Black coaches (MBlackCoordinator =
139,409). The hometown population of White position coaches was 19% Black
(MWhitePosition = 68,918) and 54% White (MWhitePosition = 192,687). The hometown
population of Black position coaches was 25% Black (MBlackPosition = 55,753) and 54%
White (MBlackPosition = 120,718). The hometown population of White coordinators was
33% Black (MWhiteCoordinator = 47,768) and 54% White (MWhiteCoordinator = 77,552). The
hometown population of Black coordinators was 26% Black (MBlackCoordinator = 36,788)
and 60% White (MBlackCoordinator = 82,944). The background of coaches is depicted in
Table 4.2.
Forty-nine Black coaches hailed from states located in the Southeast United States
(AL = 12; AR = 2; FL = 6; GA = 7; LA = 8; MS = 6; SC = 3; TN = 1). Thirteen Black
coaches were from the Midwest (IL = 2; IN = 1; MI = 1; OH = 3; OK = 1; TX = 5), 7
were from the West Coast (AZ = 1; CA = 6), 5 were from the Northeast (CT = 1; DC =
1; MD = 2; NJ =1), and 2 were born internationally (Jamaica = 1; Congo = 1). Thirtyfour White coaches were from the Southeast (AL = 9; AR = 3; FL = 5; GA = 4; LA = 3;
MS = 3; SC = 5). Twenty-five White coaches were from the Midwest (IA = 1; IL = 1; MI
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= 3; MN = 1; MO = 5; NE = 2; OH = 3; OK = 3; TX = 6), 16 were from the Northeast
(CT = 1; MA = 1; NJ =4; NY = 4; PA = 3; RI = 1; VA = 1; WV = 1), and 15 hailed from
the West Coast (AK = 1; AZ = 1; CA = 6; CO = 4; NV = 2; UT = 1). A distribution of
coaches’ home states is illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
Racial Composition of Recruits
Overall, 653 recruits were examined as part of this study. Black recruits
accounted for 87% of the total (n = 569) and White recruits the remaining 13% (n = 84).
Forty-nine 5-star recruits were signed by SEC programs from 2018-2021. Forty-five fivestar recruits were Black (91.8%) and 4 were White (8.2%). Four-star recruits accounted
for the largest number of recruits (n = 312) with 92.6% Black (n = 289) and 7.4% White
(n = 23). Of the 27 White recruits rated as a five- or four-star, 41% played the
quarterback position (n = 11). Comparatively, of the 334 Black recruits rated as a five- or
four-star, only 2.7% played the quarterback position (n = 9). Three-star recruits
represented 45% of all recruits in the study (n = 292) with 80.5% of three-stars being
Black (n = 235) and 19.5% White (n = 57). The racial composition of recruits is depicted
in Table 4.3.
Background of Recruits’ Hometowns
The median age of Black recruits’ hometowns was 36.7 and 36.3 for White
recruits. The percentage of high school graduates was similar for Black and White
recruits (MBlackRecruit = 86.4%; MWhiteRecruit = 86.8%). White recruits came from
hometowns with a higher median annual household income (MWhiteRecruit = $59,638) than
Black recruits (MBlackRecruit = $52,837). The percentage living below the poverty rate was
greater among Black recruits (MBlackRecruit = 19.4%) than White recruits (MWhiteRecruit =
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16.8%). Black recruits’ hometowns had a greater population (MBlackRecruit = 220,282) than
White recruits (MWhiteRecruit = 130,871). Black recruits’ hometown Black population was
73,703 (33.5% of the total population) and White recruits was 47,521 (36.3%). Black
recruits’ hometown White population was 111,162 (50.5%) and White recruits was
70,733 (54%). The background of recruits is depicted in Table 4.4.
Five-, four-, and three-star recruits differed in hometown demographics
depending on the recruit’s race. The hometowns of Black five-star recruits featured a
higher median age (MBlack5Star = 36.2) than White five-star recruits (MWhite5Star = 34.8).
Black four- and three-star recruits had similar hometown median ages to White four- and
three-star recruits (MBlack4Star = 36.6; MBlack3Star = 36.9; MWhite4Star = 36.1; MWhite3Star =
36.6). Black five-star recruits came from hometowns with a lower percentage of high
school graduates (MBlack5Star = 86.8%) than White five-star recruits (MWhite5Star = 88.4%).
Black four-star recruits also hailed from hometowns with a lower percentage of high
school graduates (MBlack4Star = 86.2%) than White four-star recruits (MWhite4Star = 88.2%).
Black three-star recruits were from hometowns with a slightly higher percentage of high
school graduates (MBlack3Star = 86.3%) than White three-star recruits (MWhite3Star = 85.9).
Black five-star recruits’ hometowns had a higher annual household income (MBlack5Star =
$58,213) than White five-star recruits (MWhite5Star = $57,343). Black four-star recruits’
hometown had a lower annual household income (MBlack4Star = $53,780) than White fourstar recruits (MWhite4Star = $54,513). Black three-star recruits were from hometowns with
lower annual household income (MBlack3Star = $50,974) than White three-star recruits
(MWhite3Star = $61,628). Black five-, four-, and three-stars came from hometowns with
greater poverty rates (MBlack5Star = 16.9%; MBlack4Star = 19.3%; MBlack3Star = 20.1%) than
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White recruits (MWhite5Star = 13.9%; MWhite4Star = 17.2%; MWhite3Star = 17.1%). Black fivestar recruits were from hometowns with smaller overall populations (MBlack5Star =
134,516) than White five-stars (MWhite5Star = 854,450). Black four- and three-star recruits
were from hometowns with larger overall populations (MBlack4Star = 247,169; MBlack3Star =
181,213) than White four- and three-star recruits (MWhite4Star = 210,054; MWhite3Star =
95,910). Black five-star recruits were from hometowns with a Black population of 30,895
(23% of the total population) and White population of 75,736 (56.3%). White five-star
recruits were from hometowns with a Black population of 79,875 (9.3%) and White
population of 459,901 (53.8%). Black four-star recruits were from hometowns with a
Black population of 80,320 (32.5%) and White population of 124,270 (50.3%). White
four-star recruits were from hometowns with a Black population of 79,935 (38.1%) and
White population of 109,898 (52.3%). Black three-star recruits were from hometowns
with a Black population of 70,786 (39.1%) and White population of 91,460 (50.5%).
White three-star recruits were from hometowns with a Black population of 32,378
(33.8%) and White population of 54,739 (57.1%).
Black recruits were predominantly from the Southeast United States (n = 362, or
74.3% of all Black recruits). The majority of Black recruits from the Southeast were from
the states of Georgia (n = 78) and Florida (n = 73) followed by Mississippi (n = 54),
Alabama (n = 48), Louisiana (n = 37), Tennessee (n = 31), South Carolina (n = 18),
North Carolina (n = 9), Kentucky (n = 7), and Arkansas (n = 7). Seventy-eight (16%)
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Black recruits were from the Midwest16, 34 (7%) were from the Northeast17, and 13
(2.7%) were from the West Coast18. White recruits were predominantly from the
Southeast United States as well (n =74, or 73.3% of all White recruits). White recruits
were most commonly from the states of Georgia (n = 18), Texas (n = 15), and Florida (n
= 14). Twenty-one (20.8%) White recruits were from the Midwest 19, 3 (3%) were from
the Northeast20, and 3 (3%) were from the West Coast21. A distribution of recruits’ home
states is illustrated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
Recruiting Responsibility
Black coaches served as the primary recruiter for 60.3% of recruits (n = 394) and
White coaches for 39.7% of recruits (n = 259). Black coaches served as the primary
recruiter for 64.1% of Black recruits (n = 365) while White coaches served as the
primary recruiter for 35.9% of Black recruits (n = 204). Conversely, among White
recruits, Black coaches served as the primary recruiter for 34.5% (n = 29) while White
coaches served as the primary recruiter for 65.5% (n = 55). Twenty-six five-star recruits
(53.1%) had a Black coach as their primary recruiter and 23 (46.9%) had a White coach.
Of the 45 Black five-star recruits, 53.3% (n = 24) had a Black coach as their primary
recruiter while 46.7% (n = 21) had a White coach. Two White five-star recruits were
recruited by a Black coach and 2 were recruited by a White coach. A Black coach served

16

Texas (47), Ohio (11), Michigan (9), Illinois (5), Missouri (3), Oklahoma (2), and
Minnesota (1).
17 Maryland (11), Virginia (8), New Jersey (5), Washington D.C. (4), Pennsylvania (3),
Connecticut (1), Rhode Island (1), and West Virginia (1).
18 California (7), Arizona (2), Utah (2), Nevada (1), and Washington (1).
19 Texas (15), Oklahoma (2), Illinois (1), Indiana (1), Missouri (1), and Ohio (1).
20 Pennsylvania (1), Virginia (1), and Washington D.C. (1).
21 California (2) and Colorado (1).
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as the primary recruiter for 65.1% of four-star recruits (n = 203) and a White coach
34.9% (n = 109). A Black coach served as the primary recruiter for 197 Black four-star
recruits (68.2%) and a White coach for 92 Black four-star recruits (31.8%). A Black
coach served as the primary recruiter for 26.1% of White four-star recruits (n = 6) and a
White coach for 73.9% (n = 17). All 11 of the White quarterbacks rated as a five- or fourstar were recruited by a White coach. Of the 9 Black quarterbacks rated as a five- or fourstar, 4 were recruited by a Black coach and 5 were recruited by a White coach. A
statistically significant relationship exists between a recruit’s position and the race of the
primary recruiter (p < .002). While there were 6 Black offensive coordinators identified
in this study, only 2 specifically coach the quarterback position; the other 4 coach the
wide receiver position. Comparatively, 23 White offensive coordinators (79%)
specifically coach the quarterback position. Not surprisingly, there is a strong statistical
relationship (p < .001) between a primary recruiter’s side of the ball (i.e. offense or
defense) and the position of recruits (e.g. an offensive coach serves as the primary
recruiter for a recruit in an offensive position). Across the coaching hierarchy, offensive
coordinators were the only group of coaches to have a statistical relationship serving as
the primary recruiter for recruits at a specific position. There is a strong statistical
relationship between offensive coordinators and serving as the primary recruiter for
recruits at the quarterback position (p < .001). No other group of coaches (i.e. defensive
coordinator or position coach) held a statistically significant relationship to a specific
position (e.g. defensive coordinators recruited all defensive positions).
A Black coach served as the primary recruiter for 56.5% of three-star recruits (n =
165). A White coach served as the primary recruiter for 43.5% of three-star recruits (n =
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127). Black coaches recruited 144 (61.3%) of Black three-star recruits and White coaches
recruited 91 (38.7%). Twenty-one White three-star recruits (36.8%) were recruited by a
Black coach and 36 (63.2%) by a White coach. Overall, a Black coach served as the
primary recruiter for 57.5% of Black recruits (n = 432) and 28.6% of White recruits (n =
42). A White coach served as the primary recruiter for 42.5% of Black recruits (n = 319)
and 71.4% of White recruits (n = 105). A statistically significant relationship exists
between the race of a recruit and the race of the primary recruiter (p < .008).
Statistical Comparisons
Race of Recruits
A statistically significant relationship exists between the race of a recruit and
position (p < .001). The race of quarterback recruits statistically differed from that of
running backs (p < .022), wide receivers (p < .001), defensive lineman (p < .001),
linebackers (p < .001), and defensive backs (p < .001). A statistical difference did not
exist between the race of quarterbacks, offensive lineman, and tight ends. Additionally, a
strong relationship exists between the race of a coach and recruits playing quarterback (p
< .001) and offensive line (p < .001). Furthermore, a relationship exists between the race
of a coach and recruits playing defensive line (p < .001) and defensive back (p < .001).
White coaches were more likely to recruit the positions of quarterback and offensive line
while Black coaches were more likely to recruit the positions of defensive line and
defensive back.
Coach & Recruit Demographic Backgrounds
A statistically significant relationship exists between the Black population of
recruits’ hometowns and the race of primary recruiters (p < .009). Recruits from areas
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with a greater Black population were more likely to be recruited by a Black coach.
Conversely, there was a statistically significant relationship between the Black population
of coaches’ hometowns and race of recruits (p < .03). Coaches from areas with a greater
Black population were more likely to serve as the primary recruiter for Black recruits.
Additionally, there was a relationship between recruits’ hometown Black population and
coaches’ hometown Black population (p < .049). Recruits from areas with a larger Black
population were more likely to be recruited by coaches from areas with a larger Black
population. A relationship also exists between coaches’ hometown median annual
household income and race of recruits (p < .053). Coaches from hometowns with lower
median annual household incomes were somewhat more likely to recruit Black recruits.
A statistically significant relationship existed between coaches’ hometown percentage
living below the poverty level and recruits’ hometown median annual household income
(p < .018). Coaches from hometowns with a greater percentage of the population living
below the poverty level were more likely to serve as the primary recruiter for recruits
from hometowns with lower median annual household incomes. Furthermore, a
relationship exists between coaches and recruits’ hometown percentage living below the
poverty level (p < .009). Coaches from areas with a greater percentage living below the
poverty level were more likely to serve as the primary recruiter for recruits from areas
with a greater percentage living below the poverty level.
Recruiting Ranking
No statistically significant relationship exists between coaches’ race and recruit
star rating (i.e. five-, four-, or three-star). However, there is a significant relationship
between recruit star rating and coaches’ Recruiter of the Year ranking (p < .001), number
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of recruits signed (p < .01), and number of Black recruits signed (p < .002). Not
surprisingly, coaches that served as the primary recruiter for five- and four-star recruits
were ranked higher in the Recruiter of the Year rankings and signed a greater number of
recruits overall and, specifically, Black recruits. The Recruiter of the Year ranking is also
significantly related to a coach’s race (p < .001). Black coaches were more likely to be
ranked higher in the Recruiter of the Year rankings.
Former Players Recruiting Success
It is very common for college coaches to have played college football (Ferguson,
2016). In fact, 83% (n = 314) of coaches in this study played college football at varying
levels. Thirty-nine coaches went on to play in the NFL. A statistically significant
relationship exists between coaches’ highest level of competition as a player and race of
recruit (p < .007), recruit star rating (p < .006), and number of Black recruits signed (p <
.001). Coaches that had played in the NFL were more likely to serve as the primary
recruiter for Black recruits, more likely to sign five- and four-star recruits, and signed a
greater number of Black recruits. The position a coach played is also a significant factor
in the recruitment of high school athletes. Coaches that played the quarterback position
(at any level) statistically differed in the number of White players they signed than
coaches that were former wide receivers (p < .004), offensive lineman (p < .001),
linebackers (p < .001), and defensive backs (p < .001). Coaches that played defensive
back statistically differed in the number of Black players they signed than coaches that
were former quarterbacks (p < .004), running backs (p < .001), tight ends (p < .001),
linebackers (p < .042), and specialists (p < .055).
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Program Recruiting Success
The football programs at University of Alabama and University of Georgia have
consistently signed more five-stars than any program in college football over the past tenyears (Stephens, 2020). Not surprisingly, there is a statistically significant relationship
between coaches from both University of Alabama and University of Georgia and recruit
star rating (p < .001). Alabama and Georgia football coaches statistically differed from
coaches at the 12 other SEC football programs in the number of five-star recruits they
signed. Coaches from Vanderbilt University, the SEC’s lone private institution,
statistically differed from all other SEC coaches in the number of White recruits they
signed (p < .003).
Discussion
The findings from this study illustrate the perpetuation of racial tasking in the
designation of recruiting responsibilities among football coaching staffs in the SEC. The
majority of Power-5 football players, and a greater percentage of starters (i.e. players
making a significant impact on the outcome of a game), are Black. There is an inherent,
and perhaps conscious, emphasis placed on recruiting Black football players given the
impact they have on the outcome of a game. This study found that Black coaches are
more likely to serve as the primary recruiter for Black recruits. Additionally, Black
coaches are ranked higher than White coaches in the 247Sports Recruiter of the Year
rankings. Black coaches were also found to have a greater recruiting responsibility
compared to White coaches. Black coaches comprised of 47% of all coordinators and
position coaches but were responsible for signing 60% of recruits. Furthermore, Black
coaches served as the primary recruiter for 53% of five-star recruits, 65% of four-star
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recruits, and 57% of three-star recruits. Among Black recruits, Black coaches played an
even more vital role serving as the primary recruiter for 53% of Black five-star recruits,
68% of Black four-star recruits, and 61% of Black three-star recruits. This study provides
evidence that Black coaches are racially tasked as recruiters and builds upon previous
literature examining the disparate roles that Black and White football coaches occupy
within college football (Turick, 2018; Turick & Bopp, 2016).
Consistent with previous research that socially-effective recruiters tend to be
more effective (Magnusen et al., 2011; Magnusen et al., 2014; Treadway et al., 2014),
this study found that coaches tend to recruit areas that are ethnically and
socioeconomically similar to that of their own hometown. Coaches hailing from
geographic areas with a large Black population are likely to serve as the primary recruiter
for recruits from areas with a large Black population. Additionally, coaches from areas
with low median annual household incomes and higher percentages living below the
poverty level are likely to serve as the primary recruiter for recruits from areas with low
median annual household incomes and higher percentages living below the poverty level.
Coaches from specific areas and socioeconomic backgrounds are valuable as recruiters
and serve as the primary recruiter for recruits from similar socioeconomic backgrounds
(Brooks, 2021; Donohue, 2015). A shared understanding of one’s life experience is
leveraged in the recruiting process and further illustrates the dominate institutional logic
of Power-5 athletics. The acceptance of racially tasking Black coaches into recruitingoriented roles exemplifies the institutional logic of jock capitalism (Southall & Nagel,
2009). Black coaches are knowingly tasked as recruiters, a role that disproportionally
limits their opportunities for advancement within the coaching profession (Hruby, 2020;
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Turick & Bopp, 2016). By disproportionately tasking Black coaches as recruiters,
predominately White head coaches and coordinators propagate the Power-5 institutional
logic that places a high value on football success.
A trend worth noting is the migration of coaches in positions of advancement.
Coordinators in this study had tended to hire one or more assistant coach from the
previous coaching staff they worked on. A similar trend exists among head coaching
hirings. This trend represents career advancement for all coaches involved (e.g. a
coordinator becoming a head coach hires their assistant coach to be a coordinator). A
similar trend exists at other hierarchical levels within coaching staffs (e.g. assistant
coaches hired to be coordinators typically hire their former graduate assistants as assistant
coaches). At each varying hierarchical level within coaching staff hirings, a migration
pattern exists that pairs coaches to one another; the advancement of one coach positively
correlates to the advancement of another coach. Within this migration, coaches are often
connected by race. White coaches tend to bring along other White coaches when they are
hired in a position of advancement. A similar pattern exists among Black coaches and is
consistent with previous literature (Cunningham & Sagas, 2005). While not entirely
surprising, the phenomenon illustrates disparate opportunities for advancement in
coaching ranks among Power-5 college football programs. White coaches are hired more
often than Black coaches as coordinators and head coaches; positions of authority,
leadership, and influence. Yet, White coaches hired as coordinators and head coaches
tend to bring along other White coaches to the new football program in a position of
advancement. This trend disproportionately affects the opportunities for Black coaches to
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advance to higher ranking positions on a college football coaching staff when compared
to their White counterparts.
This study revealed that often a precursor to becoming an assistant coach was
being a graduate assistant coach. Per NCAA rules, there are only four graduate assistant
positions on each coaching staff and they are extremely coveted positions (American
Football Coaches Association [AFCA], 2020). While sought after, graduate assistant
positions in this study tended to be held by former quarterbacks. In fact, 25% of graduate
assistant coaches were former college quarterbacks. There are a number of reasons
quarterbacks might be valued as graduate assistants (e.g. the knowledge of play-calling
and schematic tendencies that are necessary to playing the quarterback position).
However, the racial composition of the quarterback position in college football reveals
there are more White quarterbacks than Black (Siler, 2019). Similarly, this study found
that 11 of the 13 graduate assistant coaches that were former college quarterbacks were
White. As graduate assistant coaches are more likely to be former quarterbacks than any
other position and the position of quarterback is traditionally White, opportunities to
become a graduate assistant coach may disproportionately affect Black coaching
candidates seeking entry into the profession. Being a graduate assistant coach is often a
precursor to entering the coaching ranks yet, the hiring process may be systematically
discriminatory towards non-quarterbacks and, therefore, Black coaches.
Conclusion and Future Research
While conversations surrounding equity in coaching hirings are commonplace,
they are typically situated in providing equal opportunity for coaches to interview for
positions of advancement (e.g. The Rooney Rule). However, this study’s findings
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illustrate systemically discriminatory practices that are present among college football
coaching hirings that disproportionately affect the opportunities for advancement for
members of a coaching staff that are Black. While the opportunities to interview for
positions of advancement may be equal under policies such as The Rooney Rule, this
trend illustrates the importance of examining the equitable opportunities for advancement
available (rather, not available) to Black college football coaches.
An examination of the intersection of race, coaching rank, and opportunity for
career advancement has potential implications across multiple subfields within the
broader field of sport management. From a practical standpoint, sports are something that
we can understand while discussing race and confronting racial issues within American
society can often be a difficult conversation. However, separating sports and race
devalues our understanding of either and compartmentalizes issues that transcend sport as
endemic to American society. Examining potentially racially motivated practices among
college football staffing calls attention to social issues within the context of sport. Future
research examining the interest convergence principle in relation to college football
coaches’ opportunities for advancement would be valuable in further uncovering the
nature of college football hiring decisions.
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Table 4.1: Racial Composition of Coaches
Coach Title

# White

% White

# Black

% Black

Head Coach

26

93%

2

7%

Coordinator

50

75%

17

25%

Offensive Coordinator

29

83%

6

17%

Defensive Coordinator

21

66%

11

34%

Position Coach

98

47%

112

53%

Graduate Assistant (GA)

43

59%

30

41%

Offensive GA

24

73%

9

27%

Defensive GA

13

38%

21

62%
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Table 4.2: Background of Coaches’ Hometowns

Coach Title

Age

% High
School
Graduates

Annual
Household
Income

% Below
Poverty
Level

Population

Black
Population

% Black
Population

Position Coaches

36.3

85.4%

$50,499

20.9%

287,821

62,072

21.6%

155,263

53.9%

36.2

85.0%

$51,335

20.9%

223,598

55,753

24.9%

120,718

54%

36.4

85.7%

$49,595

21.0%

357,395

68,918

19.3%

192,687

53.9%

36.5

84.7%

$49,354

21.0%

141,850

44,631

31.5%

79,093

55.8%

38.4

85.7%

$46,931

20.9%

139,409

36,788

26.4%

82,944

59.5%

35.8

84.3%

$50,323

21.1%

142,827

47,768

33.4%

77,552

54.3%

Position Coaches
(Black)
Position Coaches
(White)
Coordinators
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Coordinators
(Black)
Coordinators
(White)

White
% White
Population Population

Table 4.3: Racial Composition of Recruits
Coach Title

# White

% White

# Black

% Black

Total Recruits

84

12.9%

569

87.1%

5-Stars

4

8.2%

45

91.8%

4-Stars

23

7.4%

289

92.6%

3-Stars

57

19.5%

235

80.5%
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Table 4.4: Background of Recruits’ Hometowns

Age

% High
School
Graduates

Annual
Household
Income

% Below
Poverty
Level

Population

36.7

86.4%

$52,837

19.4%

220,282

73,703

33.5%

111,162

50.5%

36.3

86.8%

$59,638

16.8%

130,871

47,521

36.3%

70,733

54.0%

5-Stars (Black)

36.2

86.8%

$58,213

16.9%

134,516

30,895

23.0%

75,736

56.3%

5-Stars (White)

34.8

88.4%

$57,343

13.9%

854,450

79,875

9.3%

459,901

53.8%

4-Stars (Black)

36.6

86.2%

$53,780

19.3%

247,169

80,320

32.5%

124,270

50.3%

4-Stars (White)

36.1

88.2%

$54,513

17.2%

210,054

79,935

38.1%

109,898

52.3%

3-Stars (Black)

36.9

86.3%

$50,974

20.1%

181,213

70,786

39.1%

91,460

50.5%

3-Stars (White)

36.6

85.9%

$61,628

17.1%

95,910

32,378

33.8%

54,739

57.1%

Coach Title
Total Recruits
(Black)
Total Recruits
(White)

Black
% Black
White
% White
Population Population Population Population

123

124
Figure 4.1: Counties with the Greatest Concentration of 5-star Recruits (Knox & Willis, n.d.)
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Figure 4.2: Black Coaches Home States
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Figure 4.3: White Coaches Home States
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Figure 4.4: Black Recruits Home States
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Figure 4.5: White Recruits Home States

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Power-5 Dominant Institutional Logic
The dominant Power-5 institutional logic has been dubbed jock capitalism
(Southall & Nagel, 2009). Big-time college sport emphasizes winning football and men’s
basketball games in order to generate revenue (Caro, 2012). However, prioritizing
winning above all else has cultivated a subculture within college athletics that feels
constrained by NCAA governance (Santomier et al., 1980; Southall et al., 2005). As
Martin (1992) noted, organizational members that feel disconnected from organizational
values may develop a counterculture that assumes deviant behavior and practices. In
Power-5 college football and men’s basketball, the formulated culture in pursuit of
success (i.e., winning) has promoted what are viewed as deviant practices within college
sport. In 2017, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) implicated college basketball
coaches from across the country in schemes to entice recruits to campus with monetary
benefits (Forde, 2021). In 2010, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill was
embroiled in an academic scandal (Murphy, 2019). Baylor University, the 5th largest
Christian college or university in the United States, was found to have fostered a culture
that tolerated sexual assault by several football players. The University’s Board of
Regents allege that former head football coach Art Briles ignored “reports of misconduct
such as drug use, physical assault, domestic violence, brandishing of guns, indecent
exposure and academic fraud” (Schlabach & Lavigne, 2020, para. 6). At Pennsylvania
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State University, football coach Jerry Sandusky sexual abused 10 young boys over the
course of 15-years with the football program. Head football coach Joe Paterno and other
high ranking athletic department and University officials knowingly employed Sandusky
and attempted to cover up the allegations of sexual misconduct to protect the coach
(Chappell, 2012). In 2016, multiple men’s basketball recruits informed NCAA
investigators that while visiting the University of Louisville the basketball program
provided female escorts at on-campus parties in athlete dormitories and paid for
prostitutes to have sex with recruits (Barr, 2016). Seemingly every season, a Power-5
football or men’s basketball program is exposed for deviant organizational behavior. In
the cases of many Power-5 scandals, the enticement of prospective athletes (i.e. recruits)
is the impetus for engaging in deviant activity.
The relationship between successful recruiting and winning is well-documented
(Bergman & Logan, 2016; Caro, 2012; Caro & Benton, 2012; Dronyk-Trosper & Stitzel,
2017; Elliott, 2020; Langelett, 2003; Pitts & Evans, 2016). As the dominant institutional
logic in Power-5 athletics emphasizes winning (i.e. revenue generation), specifically in
football and men’s basketball, the importance of successful recruiting cannot be
understated. Power-5 football programs invest heavily in recruiting by building multimillion-dollar facilities and stadiums and allocating millions of dollars to recruiting
efforts; 95% of Power-5 football programs spend over a million dollars on recruiting
annually (Ching, 2018). Power-5 football head coaches invest both financially and
physically in recruiting as successful recruits is positively related to winning football
games and winning football games increases the likelihood of job retention for head
coaches (Maxcy, 2013). As the byproduct of jock capitalism, heavily invested
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institutional actors engulfed in their athletic roles may engage in deviant behaviors and
practices. This deviance set the stage for the 3 studies that comprise this dissertation.
While recruiting is heavily publicized in sport media and followed closely by
ravenous fanbases, not much is known about the specifics of the recruiting process. Sport
media tends to cover macro-stories such as where a recruit is taking an official visit or
which program signed the highest ranked recruiting class. As the majority of youth
athletes are not recruited to play sports in college, the minutia of the recruiting process is
relatively unknown. Relying on my intimate knowledge of the recruiting process in
Power-5 football, I sought to expose commonplace recruiting practices and behaviors in
each study included in this dissertation. When analyzed through an institutional logic
framework it is apparent that the findings of each study illustrate the promulgation of jock
capitalism in SEC football. Official visits were found to serve as ceremonial facades that
glorify the demands of being a college athlete by focusing primarily on social and athletic
activities; providing recruits with an inaccurate expectation as to the demands of being a
college athlete, specifically in the context of academics. Power-5 football players
graduate at much lower rates than their peers (Corr et al., 2019; Corr, Eckard et al., 2020)
and may enter college underprepared to succeed academically (Hock, 1998; Peters,
2013). The Power-5 dominant institutional logic and the importance of signing the top
recruits pressures recruiters to mythicize the life of a college athlete by designing official
visits to focus primarily on social and athletic activities. Engulfed in their role as college
football recruiter, recruiters unconsciously adhere and indoctrinate recruits to the Power5 dominant institutional logic. Recruiters, and recruiting, serves to exploit the glorified
status that Power-5 football players enjoy on college campuses in the United States as a
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means to entice recruits to sign with their program. By neglecting the academic rigors of
college, Power-5 football recruits enter college unprepared and unmotivated
academically. As the majority of Power-5 college football players, and thus recruits, are
Black, the Power-5 college football recruiting process disproportionately negatively
affects Black athletes.
Black coaches are disproportionately targeted within the recruiting process as
well. As Hawkins (2010) noted, Black football coaches serve as the gatekeepers for
recruiting Black recruits that, in turn, play college football under the leadership of White
head coaches and coordinators. Black coaches are racially tasked as recruiters which
disproportionately negatively affects opportunities for advancement within the coaching
profession (Turick, 2018; Turick & Bopp, 2016). This dissertation concludes the
dominant Power-5 institutional logic permeates an ideology that “race gets race,” which
results in the disproportionate deployment of Black coaches to sign Black recruits.
Additionally, the socioeconomic status of coaches and recruits are exploited. Coaches
from areas with large Black populations, lower median annual household incomes, and
higher percentages living below the poverty level are utilized to sign recruits from
statistically similar areas. While further examination is needed, it perceivably is in the
interest of predominantly White administrators (i.e. athletic directors), head football
coaches, and coordinators to not employ Black football coaches above the rank of
position, or assistant, coach.
Conclusion
While working in college football recruiting in the SEC was an extremely
stimulating career, my indoctrination into the Power-5 dominant institutional logic led me
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to engage in deviant practices and behaviors under the guise of the espoused ideals
central to NCAA, Power-5, and SEC athletics. I knowingly committed NCAA violations
and, to this day, justify the reasoning behind committing them. I knowingly leveraged
coaches’ race and socioeconomic backgrounds when determining geographic recruiting
areas. I knowingly formulated official visits to reflect the glorified status college football
players at SEC institutions enjoy. Engulfed in my role as recruiter, I ignored many of my
moral sensibilities to sign the best recruits. After all, signing the best recruits is the job of
any Power-5 football recruiter.
In many ways, the composition of this dissertation was an extremely cathartic
process. I routinely grapple with the decisions, behaviors, and practices I either openly
initiated or engaged as a recruiter. Exposing various elements of the recruiting process
that are commonplace across Power-5 football was intensely gratifying. While in 2021
broad NCAA reform is being pursued by legislators (i.e. name, image, and likeness) and
the merit of NCAA regulations argued before the Supreme Court (i.e. NCAA v. Alston,
2021), the NCAA and its institutional members, lawmakers, and invested organizational
actors should advocate for increased dedication to the espoused NCAA values of
promoting educational opportunities for college athletes. Jock capitalism promotes
deviant practices that devalue the academic experiences and opportunities for meaningful
educational attainment among Power-5 football and men’s basketball players. Given that
the majority of marginalized Power-5 college football and men’s basketball players are
Black, decision makers should commit to initiatives that enhance the value of educational
attainment and academic success among administrators and football and men’s basketball
coaches, players, and recruits. In the wake of the Summer of 2020 social justice
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movement, college athletic departments and football programs should reexamine hiring
practices to ensure that coaching responsibilities are based on merit rather than race.
Demarginalizing Black coaches as recruiters may lead to a more equitable distribution of
Black and White coaches in Power-5 college football.
College athletics recruiting is a fundamental component to NCAA athletics.
College athletics provides opportunities for many recruits to attend prestigious colleges
and universities they may not have had the opportunity to attend otherwise. Many Black
coaches from certain socioeconomic backgrounds played college football and are
indicative of the upward social mobility that college athletics can offer. However, given
the findings of this dissertation, the recruiting process is only partially benefitting football
recruits in the Power-5, and the SEC specifically. The recruiting process has a
disproportionately negative effect on Black coaches and players and serves to
underprepare recruits for the academic rigors of higher education. While the NCAA
champions a value system predicated on academic and equitable opportunities, the
prioritization of winning football games and revenue generation have influenced the
recruiting process. To accomplish both adequately preparing Power-5 football recruits for
college and attaining the equitable distribution of Black and White head football coaches
and coordinators, stakeholders must pivot from the recruiting process as an extension of
the money-making enterprise of college athletics. An altruistic shift towards the welfare
of recruits would lead to the recruiting process being truly beneficial to recruits.
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